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WILD POLITICAL DREAMING: HISTORICAL CONTEXT,
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND SUPERMAJORITY RULES
Brett W. King*
In America-a democracy founded on a belief in popular sovereignty-
most people agree that, at least at some level, the fundamental principle' of
majority rule should prevail, and that political decisions may be made by
the majority simply because it is the majority.! However, most people also
recognize that certain issues may legitimately require more than a majority;
that certain questions-such as amending the Constitution or impeaching a
President-may require the assent of two-thirds or three-fourths to be con-
cluded.3 This paradox of democracy exists because we understand that al-
though majority rule is a fundamental principle within a democracy, an
equally compelling imperative of a liberal/civil society is that individual
rights be protected and a neutral political framework be maintained. In the
Western political tradition, this generally means a constitution prescribing
rules and rights that are beyond the ability of simple majorities to alter or
" Associate. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Hong Kong) and Ph.D. candidate in Po-
litical Science, the University of Chicago; J.D. and MBA (Kellogg) 1990. Northwestern University;,
BA. and B.S. 1986, the University of Minnesota. This paper is the fourth in a series on the interrela-
tionship of supermajority requirements, democratic theory, and majority rule.
The use of the term "fundamental principle" is a deliberate reference to the Framers' rhetoric on
majority nle. See TE FEDI T No. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter THE FEDERALIST] (declaring that a "fundamental maxim of republican government...
requires that the sense of the majority should prevail"); it. NO. 58. at 361 (James Madison) (proclaim-
ing majority rule "the fundamental principle of free government"); see also TOMAS JIFERSON, Notes
on the State of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JE-FE:tSON 23.171 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.. 1975)
("Lex majoris parfis [is] founded in common law as well as common righL It is the natural law of
every assembly of men...."); State v. Stacy, 82 So. 2d 264. 265 (Ala. 1955) ("It is a fundamental
principle of popular government that the legally expressed will of the majority must prevail in elec-
tions.").
2 See, e.g., JESSE I. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NAIONAL POLrTICAL PROCESS 4 (1980)
(ILL). Choper observes:
Whether one looks to such classical theorists as Aristotle, Locke, and Rousseau. to such main-
stays of American political thinking as Madison, Jefferson, and Lincoln, or to this nation's con-
stitutional development from its origin to the present time, majority rule has been considered the
keystone of a democratic political system in both theory and practice.
lai.
3 The U.S. Constitution currently contains nine supermajority requirements. including a required
two-thirds vote of Congress or the States to initiate the amendment process (U.S. OONST. art. V); a two-
thirds vote of one house of Congress to expel a member (U.S. CONST. art. L § 5, cl. 2); and a two-thirds
vote of the Senate for conviction of an impeached public official (U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 3, cl. 6). See
generally Brett W. King, The Use of Supennajority Provisions in the Constitution: The Franers, The
Federalist Papers and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SE'ON HALL CONS?. L.J. 363
(1998) (discussing the types of supermajority provisions in the U.S. Constitution).
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abolish.4
Our popular idea of democracy exists comfortably within the notion of
limited majoritarianism, and in spite of this paradox, few people question
the legitimacy of the American political system because of the existence of
supermajority rules. This comfort, however, often escapes legal and politi-
cal theorists, who are in many instances troubled by supermajority re-
quirements.5  Because simple majority rule is a concept that, a priori, fa-
vors no group and preferences no outcome, its neutrality lends it an air of
both external legitimacy and reified neutrality.7 Once simple majority rule
is departed from, preexisting preferences become favored, a concept that is
not easily accepted by those who assert that the very notion of democracy
entails the existence of a neutral political framework around which com-
peting interest groups in society compete for policy outcomes.
It might be assumed that after more than two hundred years of Ameri-
can democracy, a theory would have emerged that would explain why it is
consistent with our conceptions of popular sovereignty to favor certain (and
only certain) preexisting preferences by not allowing the majority to rule on
those (and only those) specific issues. Unfortunately, to date no such the-
ory has become generally accepted by American political and legal schol-
ars, leaving a theoretical vacuum at the heart of our received version of
4 See David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76
IOWA L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1990) ("We believe in the principle of majority rule, and we believe, concur-
rently, that not everything is subject to it. The Constitution's embodiment of these competing ideas in
part reflects political expedience and pragmatic concerns.") (citations omitted).
See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional En-
trenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 251 (1996). Katz notes:
Many sovereign peoples, through their constitutions, alienate part of the right to democratic self-
government either by requiring supermajorities to make changes to fundamental law or by pro-
hibiting certain changes outright The notion that an omnipotent sovereign entity, such as the
crown or the people, can choose to give up some of its sovereignty is a logical conundrum that
has troubled not only lawyers and political scientists, but also many philosophers and logicians.
Yet it is not a purely esoteric question for bleary-eyed academics rummaging through dusty old
libraries. Democracy often clashes with assertions of rights in modem politics.
Id. at 253-54 (citations omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epi-
logue, in CONSTTIMONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 327, 327 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988)
("Constitutions operate as constraints on the governing ability of majorities; they are naturally taken as
antidemocratic."). Not all scholars are troubled by the paradox, however. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SmENS: STUDIEs tN RATIONALrrY AND IRRATIONALrrY 6 (1979) (discussing the rationality of
precommitment strategies); Dow, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that the "countermajoritarian difficulty" is
not a problem because there is nothing inherently wrong with a society holding logically irreconcilable
beliefs, that is, the concurrent belief in both majority rule and limited government).
6 See Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Ma-
jority Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680, 683 (1952) (" [A] group decision ... that is not based on sim-
ple majority decision ... will either fail to give a definite result in some situation, favor one individual
over another, favor one alternative over the other, or fail to respond positively to individual prefer-
ences.").
7sThis is especially important for processed-based theories of democracy, although every process-
based account is informed in some manner by underlying substantive values. See generally JOIHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 73-75, 100 (1980) (arguing that constitutional interpretation must
take account of participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing values); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puz-
zling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (insisting that
constitutional interpretation necessarily involves substantive value choices).
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democratic liberalism.8 The failure of American political and legal theo-
rists to craft such a theory is due in part to its perceived consequences.
Any theory that might justify the use of a three-fifths (60%) or two-thirds
(66.6%) decision rule should be equally effective at justifying a nine-tenths
(90%) decision rule, or even the rule of a single person (99.9999%)? Once
simple majority rule is departed from, there is no logical stopping point
between a fifty-one percent rule and autocracy," and so political and legal
theorists-staring at a slippery slope of supermajoritarian theory that would
seem necessarily to imply a justification for dictatorship-back away from
the precipice and instead choose either to reframe the question or deny the
existence of a wholly principled solution."
Although there may be no complete and coherent answer to the demo-
cratic paradox," the lack of any general consensus over the appropriateness
and legitimacy of departures from majority rule is troubling, for it allows
those who wish to entrench certain policy preferences into the democratic
architecture of American politics to justify such actions based on the his-
torical use of majority and supermajority rule making. And it serves as a
8 The failure of American theorists to craft a solution to the paradox of democracy is not due to a
lack of effort or attention. Indeed, the amount of attention paid to this subject has been considzrable, if
notable in its failure to achieve a consensus. See generally BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMNT
(1965); KEITH GRAHAM, THE BATILE OF DatOCRACY (1986); Ross HARRISON. DBOCRACY (1993);
Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTI'tiIo.ALIS.M AND
DIEmOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988); Richard Wollheim, A Paradox in the Theory
of Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITCS AND SOCIETY 71 (Peter Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds, 2d cd.
1962).
9 That is, if a 99.9999% decision rule is employed, it effectively empowrs a single individual to
thwart the will of the majority.
10 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article
V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 503 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, The Consent of the Governed] ("Once ma-
jority rule is abandoned, there is no logical stopping point between, say, a 50% plus two rule, and a
99.9% rule.").
" That is, they attempt to "dissolve" the question by asserting that the problem is not the failure to
craft a coherent answer, rather, the problem is that we have been asking the wrong question all along.
See Dow, supra note 4, at 6.
'2 Much like modem physics, in the post-Realist world politicalnlegal theory exists with a certain
degree of inevitable uncertainty. I agree that it is probably best to avoid " the algorithmic tendencies in
some versions of liberal theory, which seek the one great rule by which difficult casts can be decide"
Alan Wolfe, Groups and Happiness, NEv RE'uBLIC, June 1, 1998, at 36. 39 (revieving NANCY L
ROSENBLutM, 1MMBERsH MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1993)) (dis-
cussing the difficulty of synthesizing group theory into a determinate set of rules). In this sense, given
both the inherent paradox of democracy and the congenital shortcomings of comprehensive legal theo-
ries, there may be no grand unified theory of democracy that elegantly distills the chaff of supermajori-
tarianism from pure democratic values, practices, and thought. It may be that an emulsive theory of
majority rule will have to suffice-that an incompletely theorized argument may be as good as it gets.
See CASS R SuNsmt, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996) (arguing that "in-
completely theorized agreements" am an effective way of dealing with contemporary political conflict
and represent the judiciary's current (although unconceded) method of decision making); Dow, supra
note 4, at 8-10 (arguing that efforts by scholars to resolve the majoritarian paradox are reminiscnt of
the quest for certainty notable in the pre-Realist legal theories of Christopher Langdell and the Formal-
ist approach to legal reasoning). With respect to the interrelationship of science., objectivism, and the-
ory, see generally PAUL DAVIES, SUPERFORCE: THE SEARCH FOR A GRAND UNIFED THEORY OF
NATURE (1984); John Leslie, Cosmology, Probability, and the Need to Explain Life, in SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 53 (Nicholas Rescher ed., 1983).
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justification not merely for those who argue for constitutional amendments
requiring supermajority votes to balance the federal budget 3 or alter the so-
cial security system, 4 but also for those who would assert that the answer
to the paradox is both possible and principled from a historical reading of
majoritarian democratic theory. One example of the latter is Yale Law Pro-
fessor Akhil Reed Amar, who has argued forcefully in a number of articles
that the American people have a right to amend the Constitution at any time
by simple majoritarian action, that such a right is based on a proper reading
of historically contextualized democratic theory, and is consistent with the
general understanding of popular sovereignty at and around the time of the
framing of the Constitution. Professor Amar promotes a kind of neo-
originalist interpretation of the Constitution, a method that has won him
considerable renown and favor among Washington's inside-the-beltway
cognoscenti, gaining him such distinguished positions as contributing edi-
tor to The New Republic magazine. 5 Amar's articles on popular sover-
eignty/majority rule have been widely cited in legal scholarship.
Despite this acclaim, I believe that a close reading of Amar's writings
on popular sovereignty/majority rule show them to be not only historically
inaccurate and oftentimes logically inconsistent, but also troubling as a
matter of public policy. I believe that Amar should best be characterized as
a "thinking man's Freeman," 16 a person who waives the Constitution, the
Federalist Papers, and other founding era texts in our faces in an effort to
promote unfounded and sometimes bizarre ideas based on a background
reading of the American historical narrative." These are harsh words, but I
believe they are accurate given my understanding of Amar's theories and
his readings of American history. In this Article, I will offer support for
my criticisms of Amar's work by analyzing his writings on popular sover-
eignty/majority rule in light of his assertions on the right of majoritarian
action. However, my analysis in this Article is not intended to be merely
critical of Amar's popular sovereignty/majority rule oeuvre or his interpre-
tations of American political history. Rather, it is hoped that a partial de-
construction of Amar's efforts will serve to highlight the dangers that exist
so long as the lack of consensus surrounding the proper use of supermajor-
ity rules persists. In this light, it is hoped that this Article will be an incre-
mental contribution toward a coherent theory of supermajoritarianism; one
step closer to answering the question: "When are departures from simple
majority rule appropriate in a democratic society?"
13 See, e.g., Ashcroft Unveils Details of Economic Plan, BULLEIN's FRONTRUNNER, Aug. 27, 1998
(reporting Senator Ashcroft's proposal for a three-part constitutional amendment requiring supermajor-
ity votes in both houses of Congress to raise taxes).
14 See, e.g., Press release of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, Feingold Moves to Close Loophole Jeop-
ardizing Social Security, Apr. 1, 1998, <http:llwww.senate.gov/-feingold/980401.htnl> (proposing a
constitutional supermajority requirement in order to ensure Social Security's protected status).15 See Notebook, NEw REPUBLIC, May 10, 1999, at 12.16 See infra note 213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Freemen movement and its as-
sociated political beliefs.
17 See infra notes 213-34 and accompanying text.
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I. AMAR'S FIRST PRINCIPLES
Professor Akhil Reed Amar is one legal scholar who has faced the
paradox of democracy head on by arguing that, indeed, there is a principled
solution to the problem. In a number of articles beginning in the mid-
1980s,"' Amar has proffered the rather radical idea that "We the Peo-
ple" 9-- or more specifically, a majority of us---enjoy an unenumerated
right to enact constitutional amendments in ways not explicitly set forth in
Article V of the Constitution. Although Article V requires that amend-
ments to the Constitution be approved by two-thirds of both houses of
Congress and then ratified by three-fourths of the states,2 Amar asserts that
historically rooted higher or "first order principles" of democracy trump
Article V's textual parameters, and that a majority of the people now has
and has always retained an unwritten right to alter the Constitution, exer-
cisable by a simple majority of the people "at any time and for any rea-
son.""' For Amar, the Constitution "empowers and limits government" but
should not be read to "limiti- [or] empower[] the People themselves." n
is See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425 (1987) (discussing theories of
popular sovereignty/majority rule) [hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism]; Akhil Reed
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited. Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CaH. L REv. 1043.
1044 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited) (arguing that "a majority of voters" possess
"an unenumerated right to amend the [U.S.] Constitution in ways not explicitly set out in Article V");
Akitil Reed Amnar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government. Popular Sovereignt . Majority
Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L REv. 749 (1994) (reiterating his viewvs on a right
of majoritarian action) [hereinafter Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government]; Amar. The
Consent of the Governed, supra note 10 (arguing that the Article V procedure is not exclusive and that
the Constitution may be amended through a national referendum); Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sover-
eignty and ConstitutionalIAmendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECtiON: THE THEORY AND PRACriCE
OF CONSTrrTrONAL AMENDmENT 89 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). For purposes of this Article. I
treat this body of Amar's work as a whole, although certain of his theories are not necessarily discussed
in each article.
19 When Amar talks about the right of "We the People" to amend the Constitution by majority ac-
tion, he is talking about the voting population of the entire United States, a sort of national referendum
right that the people have to alter the Constitution at wilL
2D Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary. shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall
be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legisla-
tures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the on:
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided, that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CON ST. art V.
21 See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18 at 1050 ("What were these 'first principles'?
Simply that the People were sovereign, and that a majority of them enjoyed the inalienable legal right-
that is, a right that they were incapable of waiving, even if they tried--to alter or abolish their form of
government whenever they pleased."); see also id. at 1050 n.20 ("The American understanding of the
right of the People to alter their government at any time and for any reason went beyond Locke's more
limited understanding of popular sovereignty.").
22 Id. at 1055. Amar is somewhat confusing in that his claim is about a "right" and not about
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Amar contends that, consistent with this first principles theory, Congress
must call a convention upon the request of a bare majority of American
voters.2 Notably, Amar does not limit the rights of the majority to impor-
tant or fundamental decision making or to times when the government is
acting against the interests of the people. For example, if more than fifty
percent of Americans wanted to make Groundhog Day a constitutionally
mandated national holiday, that majority could assemble and do so at its
pleasure, notwithstanding the text of the Constitution or the contrary senti-
ments of the Congress, the President, or the states.2
What is the basis of this "First Principles" theory.r Amar asserts that,
because the people are sovereign, an accurate historical understanding of
popular sovereignty theory means that a majority of the people enjoy the
inalienable right to alter or abolish its form of government whenever that
majority pleases.26 Amar tells us that these First Principles should be un-
derstood to "represent the essence of the American Revolution." 7  But
Amar goes further than mere academic conjecture, for he is not asking us to
adopt First Principles, he is asking us to readopt them. According to Amar,
at the founding there existed a collective understanding by the Framers and
the people that the new American constitutional structure restricted only
the government itself, and that the people would always be able to alter or
amend the Constitution as and when they saw fit-irrespective of Article
V's textual reservations. That is, First Principles is not a new and interest-
ing interpretive method born of post-modernist insights into power rela-
tionships, socio-linguistic uncertainty, and skepticism over objective real-
ity. Rather, Amar asserts that First Principles was the original
understanding of the Framers at the time of the founding, and that some-
how this understanding gradually receded from our collective conscious-
ness like a kind of ideological Cheshire Cat, fading slowly into the back-
ground of political/legal history. Presently, First Principles is beyond our
ken, because we have all been taught to look at the Constitution, as Amar
puts it, through the "wrong end of the telescope." ' Through Amarian
readings and insights, however, we can (it would seem) regain a proper un-
derstanding of the Framers' ideas and restore popular sovereignty/majority
"power." See Dow, supra note 4, at 55 (noting that the question of power "lies in history and on the
battlefield," while an argument that the people can alter the government outside of Article V is "quite
specifically a point about rights"). This Article will disregard any distinction between right and power
in Amar's work.
See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1044-45, 1061, 1065.
See Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: Responses to Responding to Imperfection, 74
TaX. L. REV. 839, 855 (1996) ("[Amar] is looking at a historical event and at a practice surrounding
this historical event. And he is giving us an account of a background understanding that makes sense of
what he sees-his solution dissolves the apparent oddity of the Founders' behavior.").
25 In this Article, the capitalized term "First Principles" refers to Amar's theory of popular sover-
eignty/majority rule as outlined by Amar in Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 18; Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18; Amar, Central Meaning of Republican Government, supra note
18; The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10.
See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 18, at 1441, 1458-64.
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1050.
28 Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government, supra note 18, at 761.
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rule to its rightful place atop the constitutional order. It is in this sense that
Amar is a kind of neo-originalist, for he is asking us to readopt a political
theory that he claims represents the true (original) meaning of the Ameri-
can democratic tradition.'
To a reader unfamiliar with the nuances of late eighteenth century po-
litical theory, an initial reading of Amar's writings might render such ideas
and interpretations intellectually compelling and historically illuminating.
In fact, Amar's First Principles theory is at once both deceptively simplistic
and suggestively alluring, in part because it is often based on some of the
most revered words in American history, such as the natural rights rhetoric
of the Declaration of Independence and the "We the People" Preamble to
the Constitution. But a close examination of Amar's work reveals funda-
mental flaws, parochialism, and inaccuracies'3 In order to bring some
structure to an unwieldy area of political thought, I have limited my criti-
cisms of Amar's First Principles to a number of discrete areas, which I
have divided into several subcategories.' First, I believe that Amar inap-
propriately capitalizes on the uncertainties and multiple meanings that are
contained in concepts such as sovereignty and inalienable rights to lend
support to First Principles.32  Second, Amar places heavy reliance on an
important doctrinal shift that he claims occurred in American political the-
ory between 1776 and 1787, a shift I have been unable to detect and which
I believe never in fact took place.33 Third, Amar culls the historical record
in an effort to find textual support for First Principles, but this effort often
2For commentary on Professor Amars originalism, see Gary Rosen. Triangulating the Constitu.
t/on, COMMENTARY, July 1999, at 59, 60-65; Cass R. Sunstein. Originalism for Liberals. NEW
REPUBuC, Sept. 28, 1998, at 31, 34 (reviewing AHIL REED AMAR. THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1993);
AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRscH, FOR THE PEOPLE (1998)).
30 Although a number of articles have appeared that criticize Amar's theory of First Principles.
many of these works have merely rejected the conclusions and consequences of his First Principles the-
ory without closely analyzing its foundational architecture. See, e.g.. Lawrence Friedman & Neals-Erik
William Delker, Book Review: Preserving The Republic: The Essence of Constitutionalism. 76 B.U. L
REv. 1019, 1042-46 (1996) (offering mild criticism of Amar's First Principles theory); Lessig, supra
note 24, at 858-60 (conceding skepticism in Amar's theory of constitutional amendment).
31 For other criticisms of Amar's First Principles theory, see Dow, supra note 4. at 29-35. 39-61
(criticizing Amar's Fist Principles arguments and dismissing them as "theories [thatl do not possess
even minimal persuasive power"); Charles Fried, The Supreme Court. 1994 Term-Fores ord: Revo-
lutions?, 109 HARV. L REV. 13, 34-45 (1995); it at 29-32 (asserting that Amar confuses the Right of
Revolution concept of "amendment" and "popular upheaval"); Henry Paul Monaghan. We the Peo-
plefs], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L REV. 121, 121-22
(1996) (arguing that Frst Principles is "historically groundless." slights the role of the states in the
Constitution, and "ignores the fact that the Constitution nowhere contemplates any form of direct. un-
mediated lawmaking or constitution-making by 'the People'); John R. Vile. Legally Amending the
United States Constitution: 77Te Exclusivity of Article V's Mechanisms. 21 CuMB. L REV. 271 (1991)
(rejecting First Principles for both original intent and general interpretive reasons); Eric Grant. Re-
sponding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, 13 Co. T.
COMMENTARY 125, 136-38 (1996) (book review) (criticizing Amar's use of historical analysis); Lcssig,
supra note 24, at 852-60 (questioning a number of Amar's Frst Principles arguments). For purpoes of
this Article, I have not discussed those weaknesses in First Principles that I believe are adequately cov-
ered in these works.
32 See infra Parts I1 & IV.
3See infra Part V.
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betrays a tendency to rely on language taken out of context or misinter-
preted in light of events at the time.' Fourth, Amar seems to slight the im-
portance of competing fundamental rights, ignoring the fact that superma-
jority rules are an imperfect mechanical solution to a sociopolitical problem
inherent in democracy. 35 Finally, I will provide support for my earlier as-
sertion that Amar should be seen as a "thinking man's Freeman," a neo-
originalist who uses the placidity of late eighteenth and nineteenth century
political rhetoric to argue for interpretations of the Constitution that are ul-
timately unsupportable and suspiciously self-serving.6
II. JOHN LOCKE AND CONSENT THEORY
IN THE COLONIAIJPOSTCOLONIAL ERA
To understand the fundamental weakness of Amar's First Principles ar-
gument, it is necessary to place it in the context of late eighteenth century
political thought, particularly the writings of John Locke. While it is gen-
erally accepted that the work of the Framers was influenced by the writings
of many political theorists, including Montesquieu,37 Hume,"s Harrington,39
and others, ° it was John Locke whose ideas formed the core ideological
foundation of the new American nation.4' Therefore, Lockean political
See infra Part VII.
35 See infra Part VIII.
36 See infra Part IX.
37 See, e.g., James W. Muller, The American Framers' Debt to Montesquieu, in THE REVIVAL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM 87 (James W. Muller ed., 1988).
See, e.g., THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 125 (1988).
39 See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTION xi (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
1977).
40 See Donald L. Doemberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 58 (1985) (" T]he colonists were influ-
enced by other political philosophers as well [as Locke], notably Blackstone, Hume, Montesquieu,
Paine, Rousseau, Sidney, and Adam Smith .... "); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elec-
tions: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189,
194 (1990) (noting the influence on the Framers of numerous European philosophers); Calvin R.
Massey, Antifederalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 987, 991 (1988). Massey
notes that:
[u]nlike Hobbes, the defender of absolute sovereign power, who regarded humans as uniformly
selfish in a world without external authority to restrain their passions, Locke sought to devise a
set of institutional arrangements which would allow individuals to escape the perils of social
disorder without having to surrender their entire stock of individual rights. Locke's goal was to
vest all of the benefits created by political union with the individuals composing the society.
Unlike Hobbes, Locke posited that the government merely succeeded to the private rights given
up to it by the contracting individual members of society. Thus, the state itself has no claim to
new and independent rights as against the persons under its control. As a modern commentator
has put it: "The state can acquire nothing by simple declaration of its will but must justify its
claims in terms of the rights of the individuals whom it protects."
Id. (quoting RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
12(1985)).
41 For a discussion of Locke's influence on various founding era politicians, including Samuel Ad-
ams, Benjamin Franklin, and James Madison, see Doernberg, supra note 40, at 57 ("It would be diffi-
cult to overstate John Locke's influence on the American Revolution and the people who created the
government that followed it."). See generally LAWRENCE H. LEDER, LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY:
EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1689-1763, at 37-40 (1968); DAVID W. MINAR, IDEAS AND
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theory is a necessary backdrop to any debate over the origins and context of
Amar's First Principles. Although the influence of Locke on the founding
era has been exhaustively documented elsewhere,"' a very brief review of
the state of Lockean political thought during the American Revolutionary
period is a necessary preface to a discussion of the historical interplay of
majority rule, popular sovereignty, and supermajoritarian theory at that
time.
For Locke, in the state of nature individuals are equally soVereign and
free. 3 and from this starting point it is necessary that any government
founded by individuals be premised on a delegation of rights and authority
to the collective-a process accomplished by contract that may only le-
gitimately occur with the consent of the governed. As Locke stated in a
chapter entitled " Of the Beginning of Political Societies":
The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts
on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite
into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst another .... When any number of Men have so consented to make
one Community or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and
make one Body Politick, wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude
the rest.M
POLmcs: THE AtmEuCAN EXPERIENCE 47 (1964). Minar maintains that Locke can be regarded as:
the advance ideologist of the American Revolution. He developed a set of political ideas %uhich
has very largely served as the basis for American political values and for the institutional struc-
ture which American and British government has since assumed. His importance for American
political thought can hardly be overestimated; indeed, there is probably no batter short summary
of the ideas of Locke than the American Declaration of Independence.
ld. (citations omitted); see also Paul R. Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Con.
duct: The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C. L REV. 548. 580-82 (1972) (discussing
Locke's theoretical contribution to the Declaration of Independence). But see DONALD S. Lurz, THE
ORIGINS OF AMIERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (1988) ("[H]istorians' cumulative work during the
past thirty years has rendered anachronistic the view that American political thought derives largely
from John Locke.").
42 See generally J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLrIcAL PHILOSOPHY 156 (2d ed. 1973);
WiLMOORE KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DoCTRINE OF MAJORITY-RULE (1965); RAatON M.
LEiOS, HOBBES AND LOCKE: POWER AND CONSENT 103-08 (1978); CB. Macpherson, The Social
Bearing of Locke's Political Theory, in LOCKE AND BERKELEY: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS
199,227 (C.B. M~artin & D.M. Armstrong eds., 1968).
43 See EPSTEIN, supra note 40.
44 JOHN LocKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348-49 (Peter Lasleti ed, Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690); see also iUi at 349-50. Locke notes that in assemblies empowered to act by positive
law:
where no number is set by that positive Law which impowers them, the act of the Majority
passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having by the Law of Nature and
Reason, the power of the whole.
And thus every Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one Gov-
ernment, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the deter-
mination of the majority, and to be concluded by it ....
l; see also FRANz NEu NN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND TiE AUTHoRrrARIAN STATE 136 (1964) (ex-
plaining that for both Locke and Rousseau, "[plopular sovereignty is the actual or potential force that
unifies the state which, for convenience, divides its functions"); Carlos F. Gonzlez, Reinterpreting
Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585,640 (1996) ("Initially expounded by Locke and Monres-
quieu, popular sovereignty found its first practical applications on American soil in colonial compacts.
then later in the Declaration of Independence, the state constitutions of the Revolutionary period, and in
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Upon the formation of civil society, the people' 5 not only delegate and
transfer rights and authority to the government, but they also a ee there-
after to accede to all laws made in accordance with the contract. 6 The ob-
jective of the contract is to overcome collective action problems and estab-
lish a government whose purpose is to "maintain peace and order within
the territory" 47 and to protect private property."
Significantly, Locke believed that the extent to which people may give
up rights iipon joining a civil society is limited. "No body can... take
away his own Life, [and] cannot give another power over it.' 9  Thus,
Locke considered each individual as naturally possessing a bundle of
rights, which for ease of reference can be divided into three categories: (1)
"Delegated Rights": those the individual cedes to the government upon
formation of a civil society; (2) "Retained Rights": those the individual
retains (but could have ceded if he chose); and (3) "Inalienable Rights":
those that are not ceded to the government because they are incapable of
being ceded, irrespective of a person's desire to do so. Inalienable Rights
are, ipso facto, retained by the people at all times. °
Once citizens join together in contractual civil society, the government
assumes a role akin to a political trustee,51 able to exercise all such power
a final incarnation in the federal Constitution of 1789."); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra
note 18, at 1431 n.25 ("John Locke's work has a more modem cast: Beginning with contractarian
premises similar to Hobbes', Locke repudiates monarchial absolutism and champions parliamentary
supremacy and popular sovereignty.").
45 One problem with Locke is that the concept of "the People" remained to a large extent abstract;
he placed little importance on defining which People would be vested with the various rights and
authority. See generally THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTruTION: THE CONVENTION OF
1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 166 (1993) (observing that references to "the People" during the Con-
stitutional Convention "did not denote a single national people as distinguished from the peoples of the
separate states, nor did [the Framers] imply any democratic conception of the ongoing political proc-
esS,'See LOCKE, supra note 44, at 348-54 (stating that when men unite to form a common society, the
process entails the relinquishment of certain of their individual rights and executive powers and the im-
plicit authorization of the society to make laws on their behalf as the public good may require); see also
Doemberg, supra note 40, at 67 (" mhe system of American government reflects Locke's concept of
government as the product of a contract among people rather than between rulers and ruled.").
47 See EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 16 (discussing Locke's theory of government and real property);
see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 124 (St. George
Tuckered., Philadelphia, Young & Small 1803). Blackstone observed that:
the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights,
which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature, but which could not be preserved in
peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the institution of
friendly and social communities.
Id.
48 See LOCKE, supra note 44, at 349.
49 LOCKE, supra note 44, at 302.
50 Locke's theory of inalienability is not wholly consistent. For example, Locke declares that indi-
viduals relinquish their natural rights upon formation of civil society. See LOCKE, supra note 44, at
351; see also KENDALL, supra note 42, at 68 (asserting that "no close reader [of Locke's Second Trea-
tise] will find it easy to understand how Locke ever got his reputation as a defender of the notion of
'inalienable' individual rights").
51 See Doemberg, supra note 40, at 61 n.50. Doemberg notes that:
The concept of government as trustee is not unique to Locke. "[Mhe idea of trust was also very
common in the seventeenth century, and while it is possible that eighteenth-century writers took
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consistent with its Delegated Rights, for the pursuit of the general good and
happiness.' 2 Upon the formation of society, the majority are to rule, unless
the original contract specifies otherwise:
Whosoever therefore out of a state of Nature unite into a Commmunity, must be
understood to give up all power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into
Society, to the majority of the Community, unless they expressly agreed in any
number greater than the majority.5
This passage is fairly persuasive evidence that Locke did not believe
that the right of a simple majority to rule is an Inalienable Right, for if su-
permajority rules are expressly allowed when made part of the social con-
tract, then the right of a majority to rule is obviously subject to (the major-
ity's own) limitations.
Once consent to the contract has been obtained, the government be-
comes the "supreme power" and each citizen has a moral obligation to
obey all laws passed by it. However, the idea of the government as trustee
is significant, for Locke was quite clear in asserting that if the government
performs acts in contravention of the powers and responsibilities delegated
to it by the people, this breach abnegates the legitimacy of the government
and absolves the people of their duty to comply with the laws made
it from Locke rather than from other authors, it is clear that it was already a political common-
place before Locke's time."
Idl (citing J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LocKE's PoLrrcAL PHILosoPHY 156 (2d ed. 1973)) (alteration in origi-
nal). For additional discussions of social contract theory, see Tim HARPER DIcTIONARY OF MODERN
THOUGHT 578 (Allen Bullock & Oliver Stallybrass eds., 1977); Burton M. isw. John Locke, in
GREAT THINKERS OF Tm WESTERN WORLD 223, 223-27 (Ian P. McGreal ed.. 1992) (arguing that
"Locke's doctrine had enormous influence on the founding fathers of the United States of America and
contributed significantly to both the American and the French Revolutions"); MASTERPIECES OF
WORLD PHILOsoPHY 438 (Frank N. Magill ed., 1961) (discussing the impact of Locke's philosophy on
the Declaration of Independence).
S2 See Doemberg, supra note 40, at 62-63. Doemberg observes that:
In emphasizing that the transfer of power from community to legislature is a delegation rather
than an alienation, Locke explicitly makes the legislature's power subordinate to the people's
"Supream Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary
to the trust reposed in them.... mhe legislative power is explicitly limited to the publick good
of the Society .... "
Id (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
53 LOCKE, supra note 44, at 351. Rousseau expressed the contrary view: "[Wlhat, falling a prior
agreement, is the source of the minority's obligation to submit to the choice of the majority? ... The
majority principle is itself a product of agreement, and presupposes unanimity on at least one occa-
sion." JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT 17 (Wilimoore Kendall trans.. Henry Regnery
Co. 1954) (1762). The majority may, even in nature, decide to create an oligarchy or a monarchy as
more conducive to its rights and interests. See LOCKE, supra note 44. at 354-57.
See LOCKE, supra note 44, at 365-66. Locke maintained that:
every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any Goy-
eminent, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the
Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his Posses-
sion be of Land, to him and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week: or wether it be
barely travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any
one within the Territories of that Government.
Id. at 366; see also Doemberg, supra note 40, at 59 n.41 ("[Blecause few people entering an estab-
lished civil society affirmatively consent to its government, and to avoid the illegitimacy that would
result from such a mass absence of consent, Locke constructed a theory of tacit consent. struggling to
ensure that the theory was neither oppressive nor illusory.").
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thereby. 5- Thus, if the people determine that their government is not acting
in their best interests, or that their government has attempted to exercise
authority outside of the bundle of Delegated Rights granted to it by the
people, then they have a Right of Revolution-to abolish the current (now
illegitimate) government and establish a new one in its place.56 For Locke,
the people's Right of Revolution was an Inalienable Right, although not
absolute; it was "not exercisable in response to isolated acts of tyranny; re-
sistance was authorized only when there was a calculated governmental de-
sign to subvert the law." 7 And Locke emphasized that resorting to politi-
cal force was not justified so long as alternative avenues of legal or civil
recourse were available.5s
One problem with a detailed contemporary reading of Lockean political
theory is its internal circularity: for Locke, the external validity of any
governmental structure is entirely derived from the consent of those subject
to the authority established by it. 9 Although Locke felt that majoritarian or
5 See LOCKE, supra note 44, at 384-85. For a discussion of the trusteeship concept in Locke, see
Doernberg, supra note 40, at 62-65 & n.62 ("Locke's view of the continuing responsibility of the leg-
islature to the people contrasts sharply with Hobbes' insistence on the absolute rights of the sovereign
once created by the social compact."); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 121-29 (Richard Tuck
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
See LOCKE, supra note 44, at 425-26. Locke wrote:
But if any one should ask, Must the People then always lay themselves open to the Cruelty and
Rage of Tyranny... I Answer. Self-defence is a part of the Law of Nature; nor can it be de-
nied the Community, even against the King himself.... [It] is the Privilege of the People in
general, above what any private Person hath; That particular Men are allowed.., to have no
other Remedy but Patience; but the Body of the People may with Respect resist intolerable Tyr-
anny ....
Id. at 438-39; see also KENDALL, supra note 42, at 127-31 (asserting that Locke's right of revolution is
to be exercised only in such cases where a majority of the society finds its government to be oppres-
sive).
57 Doernberg, supra note 40, at 64 n.70 (citing JOHN H. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY
OF SOVEREIGNTY 95 (1978)) (" [T]he right of revolution is designed, in Locke's view, to deal with the
situation where government falls to rule within its proper boundaries.").
58 See PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REvOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at 32 (1973); see also John R.
Wallach, Reagan Misuses U.S. History in Seeking Aid for the Contras, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1986, at
E25. Invoking Locke, Wallach observes:
No revolution could be justified simply by a group of politicians, activists or intellectuals as-
serting that the existing government was not serving "the real interests" of the people. The ex-
press wishes of a stable majority had to have been violated; the express consent of the majority
of the people had to have been lost. Otherwise, the current regime would have to be tolerated,
and changes in its practice could be justifiably promoted only by normal political means.
Id.; see also Lewis W. Beck, Kant and the Right of Revolution, 32 J. HIST. IDEAS 411, 413-15 (1971)
(discussing Kant's denial of a right of revolution in light of his enthusiasm for French and American
revolutionary activities).
59 The exact basis of Locke's beliefs is not clear, although he was undoubtedly at heart a natural law
philosopher. See STERLING POWER LAMPRECHT, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN
LOCKE 136 (1918) ("There is no point which Locke insisted upon more constantly and more forcefully
than that all legitimate governments rest upon the consent of the governed."); David R. Dow, Individu-
als, Governments, and Rights: A Reply to Cathleen Herasimchuk, 30 S. TEX. L. REV. 369, 374-75
(1989) (discussing Locke as a natural law philosopher). For purposes of this Article, I will put aside
our post-modern skepticism over Lockean thought's internal circularity and emphasize instead those
ideas that were critical to the founding era of American democracy.
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supermajoritarian voting rules could be legitimized by original consent.' he
did not spend time justifying his assertion that such consent-the voluntary
assent to authority-either meant or defined its legitimacy or circumscribed
when and how consent was itself an object of authority, coercion, or power;,
consent was to be the ultimate "rule of recognition" for Locke, beyond
which little else mattered." In a Lockean world, once consent is obtained,
it's "turtles all the way down."2
Notwithstanding our modem-day problems with Locke, his work
played a fundamental role in the founding era. The notion of consent as the
key to political legitimacy did not merely seep into American political
thought, it flowed throughout pre-Revolutionary democratic discourse and
became the ideological basis for the American Revolution and the post-
Colonial period. The primacy of its status was confirmed by its conspicu-
ous placement in the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Con-
federation" and the U.S. Constitution.'  So influential was the notion of
"See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward A Defense of the
Unanimity Ruie for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L REV. 1417,1439-40(1997). Primus notes that
According to John Locke, "[e]very man, by consenting with others to make one body politic
under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit
to the determination of the majority." Rousseau wrote that the obligation to obey the majority
proves that there must have been an original social convention at which people agreed unani-
mously that the majority would govern. For both Locke and Rousseau, majority stands in need
of justification, but the original unanimity they imagine is self-evidently legitimate.
Id at 1439 (citations omitted).
61 See generally Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution. in
RESPONDING TO INPERFECrION, supra note 18. at 147-48 (" [Cjonstitutions rest on logically antecedent
presuppositions that give them their constitutional status [and make up their ultimate rule of rcogni-tion .").
That is, for Locke, there was no need to go beyond certain foundational norms, such as consent
and human free will; he considered the meta-nule of natural rights to be self-declaring. From a late
twentieth century perspective, such an assumption is problematic. If the entire notion of natural rights
and other such ideas are rejected (e.g., if reality is deemed to be socially constructed, making the con-
cept of natural rights no more than historical discourse entangled in a Western humanist m)th), then
constructs such as consent and contract could have radically different meanings. However, once post-
modem scholars dismiss the self-declaratory nature of ideologies, we, unlike Locke. are faced with an
infinite regress, where no meta-rule can ever be externally legitimized. This Article will therefore take
as given many historical assumptions with respect to human political behavior, and will proceed with
Lockean and other ideological and meta-ideological constructs as they have traditionally been em-
ployed in American political and legal thought. In short, this Article presumes the existence of. and
rests squarely on the back of, at least one turtle. See STEPHEN HAWKING. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1
(1988) (employing the turtle example in the context of recta-rules of indeterminacy); Roger C. Cram-
ton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO LJ. 1, 2 (1986) (e.amining the history of the turtle exam-
ple). See generally MAURmCE MERLEAu-PONTY, PHENO.MNOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (Colin Smith
trans., Routledge and Kegan Paul 1962).
6See TilE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (using the notion of consent as a legiti-
mizing rational for severing political ties with England and establishing a new nation).
6See Articles of Confederation, art. XIII (requiring the unanimous consent of the states to alter the
document).
"See U.S. CONST. art. VII (requiring a state to consent to the Constitution before the document
became binding on the state and its people); see also Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The
Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L REV. 535, 567 (1995) ("The requirement of con-
sensus is not the child of some esoteric academic theory or some abstract modem day notion of justice.
It originates with the American conception of sovereignty and constitutional governance .... ").
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consent during the founding era that Thomas Jefferson went so far as to de-
clare that "[e]very constitution then, and every law, naturally expires at the
end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of
right."66 Although Jefferson would later be accused of sinning "grossly on
the side of abstraction," '67 his preoccupationo with consensual rights and
strict majoritarianism demonstrates the degree to which the idea of consent
as the legitimizing meta-narrative of popular government had become gen-
erally acknowledged,6 even to the point where, for Jefferson, the absence
of explicit consent because of temporal succession becomes problematic.
In addressing Jefferson's intergenerational dilemma, Madison rejected
natural rights and firmly grounded his ideology in contract: "On what
principle does the voice of the majority bind the minority? It does not result
I conceive from the law of nature, but from compact founded on conven-
iency. A greater proportion might be required by the fundamental constitu-
tion of a Society if it were judged eligible." 7
Once original consent is obtained and the contract is in place, how is
governmental change effected as circumstances change? Unless provided
for in its terms, the Lockean social compact would be effective until such
time as the government were to abuse the power delegated to it or assault
the fundamental rights of the people in violation of the raison d'6tre of the
compact itself. For Locke and others, contractual rigidity was less impor-
tant than the notion of in perpetuity that was so favored by prior genera-
tions.7 In fact, many post-Colonial era state constitutions did not contain
amendment provisions, leading a number of historians to view the Consti-
tution's Article V supermajority amending provision as one of its most
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETrERS
631, 634 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter LETTERS]. This is a fairly unsophisticated view
of liberalism, at least from a late twentieth century perspective. For a more robust discussion of con-
temporary liberal-democratic theory, see STEPHEN HOLMES, ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(1994) (arguing that constitutional precommitment is justified because it does not enslave but rather
enfranchises future generations by creating a governmental structure that ensures individual liberties).67 ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 69 (1964).
68 Jefferson went so far as to use French mortality tables to construct a time frame of generational
passage to arrive at the 19 year period. See Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Con-
stitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 172 (1997).See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 182 (1969)
("It was axiomatic by 1776 'that the only moral foundation of government is, the consent of the peo-
ple."') (citation omitted).
70 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 14, 1790), in LETrERS, supra note 66, at
652. See generally CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPrS (1930);
BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1931); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Con-
stitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993).
71 See JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1764), re-
printed in 4 U. Mo. STUD. 303, 318 (1929). Otis argued that:
the community may be said.., to be always the supreme power, but not as considered under
any form of government, because this power of the people can never take place, till the govern-
ment be dissolved and such dissolution may only happen when the government violates the fun-
damental rights of the people.
Id. (quoting LOcKE, supra note 44, at 385).
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novel aspects? But can a majority adopt supermajority rules to limit future
majorities from changing the terms of the contract? According to Locke
and Madison, the answer is clearly "yes." If one accepts First Principles
at face value, however, the answer must be "no." So who is correct,
Locke, Madison et. al., or Amar?
m-. AMAR AND SOVEREIGNTY
One of the cornerstones of Amar's First Principles is the notion that
"We the People" are sovereign, and we are therefore unrestricted in our
ability to govern ourselves. Amar offers up historical rhetoric and textual
citations in an attempt to convince us that the Framers understood that the
ultimate sovereign in America was to be the people of the United States,
and that more than fifty percent of the people (acting as a whole, and not
through the states) have the right to do as they please, consistent with the
theory of popular sovereignty on which American democracy rests. In
particular, given an historical understanding that there can be one and only
one sovereign, if the American people are truly sovereign, then there can
logically be no authority higher than the people. Therefore, the people
must at all times retain the authority to govern themselves, including the
authority to change the Constitution as and when they see fit.
To analyze Amar's First Principles on this point, one must start by
asking a simple and yet terribly complex question: In the United States,
precisely who is sovereign? The issue of sovereignty was "the most im-
portant theoretical question" that was debated in post-Revolutionary
America-the "ultimate abstract principle to which nearly all arguments
were sooner or later reduced" br Colonial and nineteenth century politi-
cians, lawmakers, and scholars.' Considering that the Civil War was
fought in large part because of disagreements over the sovereignty of the
states and their proper role in a federalist system, it might be expected that,
by the end of the twentieth century, American political and legal theorists
would have developed a concise and cogent theory of sovereignty. Unfor-
tunately, the concept of sovereignty remains as addled and imprecise a po-
litical construct today as it was in Colonial America.
The confusion surrounding the concept of "sovereignty" stems in large
part from the diverse set of meanings that are encompassed by that single
word. Only by unpacking two of the variations that have been compressed
into the notion of "sovereignty" is a coherent discussion of First Principles
possible?5 Historically, and in its purest form, the term "sovereignty" refers
See, e.g., LUz, supra note 41, at 110; Dow, supra note 4, at 32 n.157 (observing that only six of
the 13 state constitutions passed after the Declaration of Independence included mechanisms for
amendment).
73 See DANIEL J. ELAzAR, THE AMEjICAN CoNsTrIJ1Omtd TRADmO N 247 (1988) (indicating that
"the essence of the American constitutional tradition [is] ... that while all governments are derived
from the people, constitutional decisions shall never be made by transient majorities").
74 WOOD, supra note 69, at 354.
75 In this Article, I divide the concept of sovereignty into "Type I Sovereignty" and "Type U Soy-
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to the "supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independ-
ent state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will. ... "'
Because this conception of sovereignty is by definition a superlative, there
can be only one sovereign; any notion of "divided sovereignty" is thus an
oxymoron, much like trying to say that there are three tallest buildings in
Chicago.77 For the sake of clarity, I will refer in this Article to this concep-
tion as Type I Sovereignty. Identifying the sovereign in America is quite
easy with respect to Type I Sovereignty. In the United States, we believe
deeply in the notion of popular sovereignty-that the ultimate (and only le-
gitimate) authority of government must (can only) be derived from the peo-
ple.78 Popular sovereignty therefore means that "The People ' 79 are the su-
ereignty." However, this is not to imply that these are the only variations of the construct; a more de-
tailed analysis of sovereignty would certainly yield a number of other variations and additional types.
Sovereignty is to political theory as subatomic particles are to physics: a basic building block-still not
wholly understood-that comes in strong and weak forms, and in various flavors, kinds and types.76 BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK'S]; see also City of Bisbec v.
Cochise County, 78 P.2d 982, 985-86 (Ariz. 1938) (discussing various interpretations of "sover-
eignty"); THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 21-22 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1880) (stating that under the American system of sover-
eignty, "the nation is possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power in respect to certain
subjects throughout all the States, while the States have the like unqualified power, within their respec-
tive limits, in respect to other subjects"); JAMES R. Fox, DICIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 410 (1992) (defining sovereignty as "the ability of a state to act without external
controls on the conduct of its affairs"); WOOD, supra note 69, at 350 (noting that Blackstone defined
sovereignty as the "supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura sunni lmi-
perii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside"); Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, America's Unique Structure
of Freedom, Address Before the South Carolina Ratifying Convention (May 14, 1788), in 2 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 577 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter ANTI-FEDERAUST
PAPERS]. Cotesworth observed that:
In every government there necessarily exists a power from which there is no appeal, and
which for that reason may be termed absolute and uncontrollable.
The person or assembly in whom this power resides, is called the sovereign or supreme power
of the state. With us the Sovereignty of the union is in the People.
Id. at 586-87; see JOSEPH LATHROP, A SERMON ON A DAY APPOINTED FOR PUBLICK THANKSGIVINO
1787, reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 871 (Ellis
Sandoz ed., 1991) ("But the constitution [of the United States]... is not, in any sense whatever, a
compact between the rulers and the people; but it is a solemn, explicit agreement of the people among
themselves."). But see Edmund S. Morgan, The Federalist, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 1996, at 37 ("The
term [popular sovereignty] is subject to various, sometimes contradictory, interpretations.").
77 This concept of sovereignty is deeply rooted in American political ideology. Political thought in
the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth century had developed a central, even axiomatic, con-
viction that sovereignty was by its very nature indivisible, that in every state there must be one and only
one indissoluble supreme power, one true sovereign from whom no appeal was permitted. As Gordon
Wood notes:
A state with more than one independent sovereign power within its boundaries was a violation
of the unity of nature; it would be like a monster with more than one head, continually at war
with itself, an absurd chaotic condition that could result only in the dissolution of the state.
WOOD, supra note 69, at 345-46; see also id. at 350. See generally ROUSSEAU supra note 53, at 162-65
(arguing that popular sovereignty is indivisible).
8 See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The fabric of American empire
ought to rest on the solid basis of the CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power
ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313-14 (James Madison) (" mhe people are the only legitimate fountain of
power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of govern-
ment hold their power, is derived...."); ELBRIDGE GERRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW
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preme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which the nation is governed.a
However, the term sovereignty is also used to denote the much broader
concept of direct political authority, which I will refer to as Type II Sover-
eignty.8' Thus, "sovereignty" also means the "paramount control of the
constitution and frame of government and its administration.""' When the
Supreme Court decides that the federal government lacks the authority to
pass a law restricting gun possession near public schools, for example, the
federal law is said to be impinging on state sovereignty." Of course, with-
out Type II Sovereignty, there could be no "state sovereignty" or "federal
sovereignty" since the people would be the only true sovereign (and there
cannot be three tallest buildings). Because the people only exercise their
sovereignty indirectly through representatives, Type II Sovereignty refers
to how the social contract divides the direct source of political authority in
areas of public policy. If the states alone are granted the authority to enact
geographically specific gun possession laws, any attempt by the federal
government to do so will be thought to trample on state sovereignty (i.e.,
CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS (1788). reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY TiE PEOPLE 1787-
88, at 6 (Paul Leicester ed., 1971) (1888) (" Mhe origin of all power is in the people., and... they have
an incontestible right to check the creatures of their own creation ... ."); NOAH WEBSTER. AN
EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY 
THE LATE
CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA (1787). reprinted in PAMPHLETs ON THE Co.NSTTmON OF THE
UNITED STATES. PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 57 ("The powers vested in Con-
gress are little more than nominal; nay real power cannot be vested in them, nor in any body. but in the
people. The source of power is in the people of this country...."). In January 1776. the Ma "--hu-
setts General Court declared: "It is a Maxim ... that, in every Government, there must exist. Soe-
where, a Supreme, Sovereign, absolute, and uncontroulable Power, But this Power resides, always 
in
the body of the People...." WOOD, supra note 69, at 362 (citation omitted).
7 Admittedly, "to invoke The People is to invoke what is at best a metaphor." Lawrence G. Sager.
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution, in CONMTTTONAL CULTURE AND D OCRAlTIC RULE
(Jack Rakove & Jonathan Riley eds.) (forthcoming).
so The modem definition of "sovereignty" in Black's Lm, Dictionary seems to accord nicely with
the understanding of the Framers. See BLACK'S, supra note 76. As James Wilson asserted, popular
sovereignty means that "in our government, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains
in the people." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENION'S ON THE ADoPrIoN OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 432 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996) (1891) [hereinaf-
ter DEBATES].
1 The concept of Type I Sovereignty is necessary to understand arguments of legislative suprem-
acy. Locke offers an account of this conception of sovereignty:
In all Cases, whilst the Government subsists, the Legislative is the Supream Powver. For what
can give Laws to another, must needs be superiour to him: and since the Legislative is no oth-
erwise Legislative of the Society, but by the right it has to make Laws for all the parts and for
every Member of the Society, prescribing Rules to their actions, and giving power of Execution,
where they are transgressed, the Legislative must needs be the Supream and all other Powers in
any Members or parts of the Society, derived from and subordinate to it.
LocKE, supra note 44, at 385-86.
'2BLACK'S, supra note 76, at 1396. See also Douglas G. Smith. An Analysis of Two Federal
Structures: The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. 34 SAN DIEGO L REv. 249, 256-7
(1997) ("Mhe concept of a division of sovereignty between a general government and subordinate
governments was not novel, but was expressed in the writings of various political philosophers well
before ratification of the Articles of Confederation.").
'3See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zone Act an un-
constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power).
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constitutionally granted state authority). Thus, historical arguments over
state sovereignty generally refer to its incarnation as Type HI Sovereignty,
in the same sense that we recognize the people as the Type I Sovereign but
confer "sovereign immunity" on actions taken by state, federal, and local
governments.' 4 Because Type II Sovereignty is derived from the constitu-
tional structure," the answer to the question "Who is sovereign?" with re-
spect to Type II Sovereignty lies in an examination of the architecture of
the Constitution.86 While there was considerable debate during the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 on the political structure of the new nation,
what emerged from Philadelphia and was ratified by the states was a con-
stitutional structure that divided authority between the states and federal
government. The states-acting as a group comprising three-fourths--
were established as the ultimate Type II Sovereign: They are answerable
only to the people, who, acting in their capacity as the Type I Sovereign,
control the government indirectly through state and local elections.87 On
this point the Constitution is clear. Under Article V, if two-thirds of the
states call for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution,
Congress must call such a convention; proposed amendments become
effective upon the approval of three-fourths of the states. This mechanism
unambiguously places constitutional sovereignt7-the "paramount control
of the constitution and frame of government" -in the states. If three-
fourths of the states so desired, they could, acting collectively, eliminate
the Presidency, the Supreme Court, or one or both houses of Congress, or
reconfigure the entire structure of the American government, including the
elimination of the federal government itself.89 If three-fourths of the states
can abolish the federal government, then the federal government cannot be
the supreme and ultimate constitutional power in the United States, since it
exists at the pleasure of three-fourths of the states.
Despite the relatively uncomplicated logic of this argument, it is one
that is not understood by those political and legal scholars who assert the
84 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (conferring sovereign immunity on state governments).
8 Because the Constitution only broadly defines the boundaries of Type H Sovereignty, accusations
of encroachments on federal or state authority are a continuing theme in American history. In contrast,
because Type I Sovereignty is absolute, the concept of impinging on popular sovereignty is completely
foreign to our democratic political system.
Even at the time of the Constitutional Convention, the sovereignty distinction was not clear. See
LANCE BANNING, THE SAcRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDINO OF TIlE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC 140-57 (1995) (noting that at the Constitutional Convention, James Madison dis-
cussed the possibility of a divided sovereignty-the possibility of a people empowering both state and
national governments with different but equal functions and powers).
87 See Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The Modem Ninth Amend-
ment's Spreading Confusion, 1996 BYU L. REv. 351 (discussing the Ninth Amendment in its historical
context during the argument over retained state sovereignty).83 BLACK'S, supra note 76, at 1396.
89 The elimination of the states might actually require more than a three-fourths consensus because
the Constitution requires a State's consent before its suffrage in the Senate may be infringed or its bor-
ders altered. See U.S. CONST. art. V; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; see also Brendon Troy Ishikawa,
Amending The Constitution: Just Not Every November, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 303, 310 (1996) ("Arti-
cle V ... represents the Framers' solution to the possibility of a renegade federal government .... ").
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primacy of the federal government, or claim "that the states today stand le-
gally naked against the potential onslaught of federal power."
' A state,
however, is unclothed when acting alone as a single state subordinate to the
federal government. Notions such as "state sovereignty" are often used to
justify the claim that the actions of a state trump the actions of the federal
government. Clearly, this is not the constitutionally prescribed balance of
power, as each state is subject to the Constitution and the federal laws
made pursuant to it as the supreme law of the land." But when the states
are acting as a group equaling at least three-fourths of their number, they
exercise authority superior to the federal government. Understanding this
structure, the Supreme Court noted inMcCulloch v. Maryland that:
No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines
which separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one
common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their states. But the
measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the
people themselves, or become the measures of the 
state governments.
When arguing First Principles, however, Amar is indeed being both
wild and a political dreamer, for First Principles breaks down the lines that
separate the states and allows the people to act collectively in a veritable
national constitutional referendum or convention." First Principles as-
sumes that a majority of the people of the United States have the rightful
authority to act notwithstanding the states-in effect, nationalizing and
consolidating the electorate into "one common mass." Indeed, Amar
seems to have little respect for the states, at one point arguing that "'We
the People of the United States' may choose to destroy states by constitu-
tional amendment." 4 On this point First Principles has drawn criticism for
DAVID L SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM 26 (1995).
91 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 C'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.403 (1819).
For criticism of Amar's "consolidation" theory, see Monaghan, supra note 31, at 137 ("Amars
'consolidation' (i.e, national popular sovereignty) claim is clearly inconsistent with Madison in Feder-
alistNo. 39, and with Hamilton in FederalistNo. 32...."); Herbert J. Storing, The "Other" Federalist
Papers: A PrelirnaUry Sketch 6 Pot Sc. REVIWER 215, 220 (1976) (noting that during the drafting
of the Constitution, the Federalists "conceded the historical and legal priority of the states"). Admit-
tedly, the debate continues even to this day. See U.S. Term Limits. Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779.846
(1995) (Thomas, L, dissenting) ("The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of
the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a
whole."); id. at 848 ("The Constitution simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the
undifferentiated people of the Nation.").
9 Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 18, at 1465 n.167. This assertion would seem
to be wild political dreaming writ large. For example, constitutional scholar J. Allen Smith calculated
that, in 1900. if properly distributed, one forty-fourth of the U.S. population could. by winning bare
majorities in the one-quarter least populous states, defeat a proposed amendment. "As a matter of fact
it is impossible to secure amendments to the Constitution. unless the sentiment in favor of change
amounts almost to a revolution." J. At.EN SM-THuE SPr OF/NIERICAN GovERNMENT 
46 (1907);
see also Denning, supra note 68, at 182 ("[A]lthough the least populated states could in theory block
reform desired by [the other ninety five percent] ... it has never happened.") (citing DAVID E. KYvMG,
ExpuctT AND AuTHENTIc AcIs: ANENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995. at 475 (1996)).
Currently, the 12 most populous states in America contain 65% of the population. with the remaining
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"[w]hat Amar has done is bypass, for ratification purposes, the states." 9 In
short, Amar's First Principles assumes the submission of the authority of
the states into the federal government, when in actuality the states are supe-
rior to the federal government as Type II Sovereigns. The Constitution
clearly gives the states the power to destroy the federal government, not the
other way around.
Additionally, Amar attempts to offer support for First Principles' con-
ception of "sovereignty" by exploiting the placidity of that word's multiple
meanings. He argues for the notion that, notwithstanding the federalist
structure of American government, indivisible sovereignty means that the
people must always be seen as the only true source of political authority.
For Amar, because it was historically recognized that there could only be
one sovereign, the people must be the one true sovereign and therefore re-
tain the right to alter or amend the Constitution at their pleasure; any at-
tempt to place limitations on that right smacks of divided sovereignty, an
impossibility given the historic understanding of that construct. This his-
torical sovereignty argument becomes problematic for Amar when a num-
ber of the Framers, particularly Madison,9 speak of dividing sovereignty in
the new nation. Amar solves this problem by concluding that, in fact, First
Principles is a coherent political theory, though the Framers themselves
were somewhat confused: "To the extent [the Framers'] understandings
[about Popular Sovereignty] were simply logically inconsistent, we today
must necessarily choose among them." The alternative explanation could
be, as I have argued, that the term sovereignty is a concept that includes a
number of different meanings. The Framers believed, as we do today, that
the people are the ultimate sovereign. They also constructed a federal sys-
tem whereby Type II Sovereignty was given to the states, and the state and
thirty-eight states having the remaining 35%. See Michael Lind, Pat Answers, NEW REPuBUC, Feb. 19,
1996, at 13 (noting the "undemocratic" nature of a proposal by presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan
to allow the Constitution to be amended by the approval of three-fourths of the states without the need
for a congressional vote, because the aggregate population of the least populous three-quarters of the
states is substantially less than 50%); see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868)
(maintaining that the Constitution contemplates a United States that is "an indestructible Union, com-
posed of indestructible States"). For a criticism of Amar's (mis)use of "We the People," see Mona-
ghan, supra note 31, at 135.
95 Dow, supra note 4, at 30.
During the constitutional debates, Madison reasoned that:
we are not to consider the Federal Union as analogous to the social compact of individuals: for,
if it were so, a majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new constitution
for the whole; which the gentleman from N. Jersey [Patterson] would be among the last to ad-
mit. If we consider the federal Union as analogous not to the social compacts among individual
men, but to the conventions among individual states .... [then] a breach of any one article, by
any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty to consider the whole convention as dis-
solved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach.
5 DEBATES, supra note 80, at 206-07. Amar does acknowledge that different Framers seemed to have
different views on what "sovereignty" meant, although this distinction is not always made clear. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (" [A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a partial
union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.").
97 Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1064 n.77.
[Vol. 2:3
WILD POLITICAL DREAAIING
federal governments were to co-exist with separate and overlapping pow-
ers. What emerged was a system born of practical expedience, not pro-
crustean adherence to any single historical conception of "popular sover-
eignty."
Finally, Amar's First Principles faces a problem of international pro-
portions. Many other democratic nations-such as Germany, France, and
India-purport to base their political systems on notions of popular sover-
eignty and yet explicitly restrict amendments to their constitutions, in some
cases even disallowing certain types of amendments altogether." In par-
ticular, Germany's Basic Law prohibits constitutional amendments on a
wide range of topics that depart from the (entrenched) concept of liberal
democracy, even in the face of overwhelming support from "We the Ger-
man People."9 While Amar does not discuss this point, if First Principles
is to be a valid political theory, it would need to differentiate the American
conception of sovereignty from the construct of the same name that has
been spreading across the globe during the past century.
IV. THE (IN)ALIENABELITY OF MAJORITY RULE
Another component crucial to Amar's First Principles theory is an un-
derstanding that the very notion of popular sovereignty entails the inherent
inalienability of the right of the majority to rule-that is, that no restrictions
may be placed on such right, even by the majority itselfro' Majority rule
must always be a first order principle.
From a purely theoretical standpoint, the concept of inalienable ma-
joritarianism is one principled answer to the paradox of democracy. Rec-
ognizing that any theory that allows for more than simple majority rule will
place us on either the slippery slope to autocracy or require contrived ex-
ceptions as to why we might allow, say, a 60% voting rule but not a
60.01% voting rule, Amar has stepped back and asserted that, at the highest
level, the majority always has the right to rule--that such a right should
93 See Katz, supra note 5, at 264 ("The French and German Constitutions, among others. explicitly
prohibit changes to fundamental democratic principles. In India, the courts have found that the consti-
tution implicitly prohibits certain amendments."). Katz continues:
German and Indian courts distinguish among constitutional principles based on their amend-
ability. While the German courts relied on text and the Indian courts relied on extra-textual
theories, both courts could have restricted their holdings to a strictly-defined, narrow group of
rules that cannot be subject to amendment. Instead, the courts found that their respective con-
stitutions elevate certain constitutional values above other constitutional rules, thus requiring the
courts to invalidate amendments that contradict certain fundamental principles.
Id. at 274. But see Lessig, supra note 24, at 857 (discussing the validity of amendment to the French
Constitution made by a majority vote of the French people that was contrary to the textual provisions of
the extant constitution).
See Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 79 (F.R.G.), official translation reprinted in 7
CONST'TmLIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert I. Flanz eds. 1994
& Supp. 1995). Paragraph 3 of Article 79 of the German Constitution prohibits changes to the basic
organization of the federal system and the principles of human dignity, democracy, the rule of law, and
the right to resist attempts to destroy the constitutional order.
100 See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited supra note 18, at 1050.
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properly be understood as a fundamental component of popular sover-
eignty.'0 ' For Amar, the people can restrict government, but the govern-
ment may never restrict the people; thus the people at all times must be
considered to retain the right to conclude decisions, constitutional text not-
withstanding. '°2
However, Amar's use of the concept of inalienable rights presents diffi-
culties at a number of levels. To understand these difficulties it is neces-
sary to understand the subtle but critical distinctions between Inalienable
Rights, Retained Rights, and Delegated Rights noted above. '°3  Again the
caveat: like much of American political ideology, although these rights
concepts lie at the heart of our modem democratic structure, there is little
consensus about them apart from their core meanings.""
As the term is generally employed by political and legal theorists, Inal-
ienable Rights are those rights that are considered innate to all human be-
ings and are so fundamental to personhood and human identity that they
may not be legitimately alienated in any way, even with the fully informed,
voluntary consent of the individual. 5 For example, a person's right to lib-
erty is generally considered inalienable in the sense that the state will nei-
ther recognize nor enforce property rights in humans, irrespective of the
nature of the consent that purports to create such rights.'O° Thus, Inalien-
able Rights are considered inseparable from the rights holder, and neither
the state nor the individual may alter that arrangement. At the founding,
the Right of Revolution-the right of the people to alter or abolish their
government whenever it acted against the interests of the people or in
breach of its delegated authority-was considered an Inalienable Right. '°7
Other Inalienable Rights commonly include the right of conscience and the
101 See generally id. (discussing First Principles).
102 See id.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
104 The terms "unalienable" and "inalienable" are generally considered interchangeable terms for
the same proposition. To avoid confusion, I will use "inalienable" in this Article.
i05 See, e.g., N. H. CONST. OF 1784, art. I, cl. IV ("Among the natural rights, some are in their very
nature unalienable because no equivalent can be given or received for them. Of this kind are the Rights
of Conscience.").
106 Thus, the state will not recognize the enslavement of a human being, no matter how such en-
slavement is created, whether by law or private contract (irrespective of how fully informed the con-
tracting parties were or the nature of the consent involved). Many people feel the right to life is inalien-
able, even in the face of a conviction for murder, thus making the death penalty problematic and the
debate over abortion intractable. While the freedom of speech is generally considered alienable, politi-
cal speech is often viewed as inalienable; thus the government may not suppress for any reason my ad-
vocacy of communism or fascism; any laws or contracts purporting to limit advocacy of communism or
fascism would be either illegitimate or per se unenforceable.
107 For a discussion of certain natural rights that were considered inalienable at the founding, see Jeff
Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L. J. 1073, 1078-79 (1991).
Rosen notes that:
only three groups of rights are repeatedly called natural or unalienable [Inalienable Rights] in
the Revolutionary declarations and state ratifying conventions: the individual right to "worship
God according to the dictates of conscience"; the individual right of "defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety"; and the right of a majority of the people to "alter and abolish" their government.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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right to pursue one's religious identity.
Inalienable Rights stand in contrast to Retained Rights, that is, rights
that can be relinquished upon the consent of the rights-holder but are not
transferred to a government upon the formation of civil society." For ex-
ample, the right to a jury trial was not given up by the people at the found-
ing, but because it may be waived by a criminal defendant, it is a Retained
Right rather than an Inalienable Right. As noted at the founding, "[a] peo-
ple, entering into society, surrender such a part of their natural rights, as
shall be necessary for the existence of that society.",o9 In one way or an-
other, most rights held by the people are Retained Rights, since they can be
either waived by the rights-holder or restricted because of the exercise of
competing rights."' Delegated Rights are those that the people give to the
government upon its formation, such as the powers granted to the state and
federal governments by the Constitution, as well as subsequent delegations
of authority achieved through constitutional amendments. The demarcation
of Retained Rights and Delegated Rights is dynamic. The right to consume
alcohol, for example, was a Retained Right at the founding, became a
Delegated Right during the Prohibition Era, and is once again retained by
the people" (subject to the right to regulate alcoholic consumption, which
is a Delegated Right given to the government).
Clearly, a distinction between Inalienable Rights and Retained Rights is
crucial for theorists such as Amar, for his entire First Principles argument is
premised on the notion that Article V cannot be the exclusive means of
amending the Constitution in a society based on principles of inalienable
popular sovereignty. That is, the right of the majority to alter or abolish its
government must be seen as an Inalienable Right. If majority rule were in-
stead seen as a Retained Right, then the Constitution would effectively
limit the rights of the majority to the terms contained in the text of the
document. Therefore, whether majority rule is more properly understood
to be an Inalienable Right or a Retained Right is fundamental to the First
0 See RIGHTs RErANED BY THE PEOPLE app. A at 351 (Roger Sherman's Draft of the Bill of
Rights (1789)) (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). Sherman contended that:
[tihe people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter into Society.
Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property and of pursuing
happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments with decency and
freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their common good, and of applying to Govern-
ment by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall
not be deprived by the Government of the united States.
Id.log John De Witt, The Letters of "John De Wit," in THE ANTtFEDEtA.ISTS 89, 98 (Cecilia M.
Kenyon ed., 1966).
n There is some confusion over the status of Delegated Rights. Jeff Rosen states that the " power to
control alienable natural rights... can be surrendered in exchange for greater security and safety;, but
both alienable and unalienable natural rights themselves are 'retained by the people' and protected by
the Ninth Amendment." Rosen, supra note 107, at 1077. This argument seems faulty, for it essentially
provides that all rights transferred by the people are also retained by the people. The Nimth Amndment
seems to make more sense if read as a confirmation that the rights not explicitly transferred by the peo-
ple to the new federal government were to be retained by the states or the people.
. See U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, repealedby U.S. CONsT. amend. XXL
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Principles argument. In order to support First Principles, Amar surveys the
historical record of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and offers up
broad language regarding the inalienable right of the people to alter or
abolish their government. Amar then asks us to conclude that such exam-
pies support his view that previous generations viewed Article V as non-
exclusive, that majority rule is an Inalienable Right, and that a majority of
the people therefore have a right to amend the Constitution at any time."2
However, it appears that the link between the historical record Amar pres-
ents and his First Principles theory is tenuous at best. Indeed, the founding
era discourse is permeated by references hostile to First Principles.
First, the problem of meaning and the indeterminacy of language that
are always present in historical scholarship plague much of Amar's work,
particularly so in his discussions of late eighteenth century political theory.
The use of the term "inalienable" in American political and legal history is
inconsistent at best, and often incoherent and inaccurate. For example, in-
alienable is sometimes employed to mean rights that are non-transferable,'
non-saleable, 4 unrelinquishable by the rights-holder,"' or forever vested
and irrevocable by any authority whatsoever."6 Despite its location at the
center of American political ideology, legal and political scholars seldom
agree on precisely what inalienability means, which rights are themselves
inalienable,"7 and what sort of justification is necessary for a right to be al-
ienated by either the state or the individual."' This uncertainty often clouds
1:2 See generally Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18.
113 See, e.g., Terrance McConnell, The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights, 3 L. & PHIL. 25, 27
(1984) ("That which is inalienable... is not transferable to the ownership of another.").
14 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) ("An entitlement is inal-
ienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.").
IS See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
179, 185 (1986) ("To characterize a right as inalienable is to claim that the consent of the right-holder
is insufficient to extinguish the right or to transfer it to another."); Arthur Kuflik, The Utilitarian Logic
of Inalienable Rights, 97 ErHIcs 75, 75 (1986) ("An inalienable right is a right that a person has no
right to give up or trade away."); Diana T. Meyers, The Rationale for Inalienable Rights in Moral Sys-
tems, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 127, 127 (1981) ("Inalienable rights are rights that cannot be relin-
quished by the individuals who possess them.").
116 See, e.g., DIANA T. MEYERS, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: A DEFENSE 4 (1985) ("[Ain inalienable
right is one that the right-holder cannot lose regardless of what he does or how others treat him and
even if others are justified in declining to grant him what he demands in exercising his right."); Stuart
M. Brown, Jr., Inalienable Rights, 64 PHIL. REv. 192, 192 (1955) ("[I]f there are any rights properly
called 'inalienable,' assertions of these rights cannot, for any reason under any circumstances, be de-
nied.").
17 This confusion is perhaps best evidenced by seemingly contradictory definitions of the term "in-
alienable rights" in Black's Law Dictionary. One definition incorporates the concept of alienation only
by consent: "Inalienable rights: Rights which are not capable of being surrendered or transferred with-
out the consent of the one possessing such rights; e.g., freedom of speech or religion, due process, and
equal protection of the laws." BLACK'S, supra note 76, at 759. The same term defined elsewhere
seems to lack the notion of alienability by consent: "Inalienable rights: Rights which can never be
abridged because they are so fundamental." Id. at 1523 (at definition of "unalienable").
118 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1479-80
(1989). Sullivan notes that:
[flour different sorts of theory defend inalienability rules in private market contexts: theories of
paternalism, efficiency, distribution, and personhood. Paternalism arguments deny that an indi-
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discussions of popular sovereignty/majority rule. Without recognizing and
attempting to navigate around the general confusion over the inalienability
construct (or at least offering a clear definition of it in his work), Amar's
citations can be read in any number of ways, often in ways contrary to First
Principles.
The ambiguity over the terms inalienable and non-alienable are evi-
denced in many places. For example, the Supreme Court has spoken of the
right of American citizenship as an inalienable right, even though a citizen
may at any time renounce his or her citizenship and thereby relinquish all
rights to it."9 The Court has termed a person's choice of vocation as an in-
alienable right,'20 yet non-compete agreements and other restrictions on fu-
ture employment are permitted. The right to participate equally in the po-
litical process has been deemed inalienable,' thereby requiring that all
legislative representation be equally apportioned according to the one-
person, one-vote principle; yet the Court has recognized that such a right
was constitutionally alienated by the Framers and the people with respect to
equal state representation in the Senate.22 During the Lochner era, the
Court's view of the right to contract was all but incoherent in the context of
vidual is necessarily the best judge of whether an exchange is in his or her best interest. Both
efficiency arguments and distributive arguments, unlike paternalistic arguments, assume that in-
dividuals can best judge their own interests. Efficiency arguments seek to remo'e ob tacles.
such as market imperfections, to the expression of those interests; distributive arguments seek to
transfer power or wealth between groups without changing or overriding their perception of
their own interests. Arguments from personhood hold that some things are inalienable because
they are too centrally constitutive of identity to be treated as commensurable with other objects
and thus as tradeable.
Id (footnotes omitted).
119 See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 784 (1988) (Stevens, J. concurring) ("American citi-
zenship is 'a right no less precious than life or liberty.' For the native-born citizen it is a right that is
truly inalienable. For the naturalized citizen, however, Congress has authorized a special procedure that
may result in the revocation of citizenship.") (citations omitted).
See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (1976) (Stevens, J. concur-
ring). Justice Stevens observed that:
"the right of the individual.., to engage in any of the common occupations of life" has been
repeatedly recognized by this Court as falling within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. As long ago as [1884]. Mr. Justice Bradley wrote that this right "is an
inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Decla-
ration of Independence ...
Id. (citations omitted).
1 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 141-42 (1971). The Whitcomb Court noted:
The line of cases from Gray v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims, to lKrkpatrick v. Preisler, and
Wells v. Rockefeller, recognizes that "representative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an
inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legis-
lative bodies."
Id. (citations omitted).
122 See Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The Constitu-
tionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CHL ROUNDTABLE 133 (1999) (discussing the exception of the
one-person, one-vote rule for geographic representation in the Senate); see also William H. Simon. So-
cial-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1351 n.42 (1991) (noting that in Lucas v' Forry.
Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), the Court suggested "that rights to a fairly apportioned
legislature are inalienable by holding unconstitutional a malapportioned legislature despite appro- by
a majority of the disadvantaged voters").
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the "inalienable" right of substantive due process. Consider this addled
passage from a Lochner-era opinion in light of the conception of "inalien-
able rights" as absolutely vested in the People, incapable of divestiture of
any kind:
While it may be conceded that, generally speaking, among the inalienable
rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of contract, yet such liberty is not ab-
solute and universal. It is within the undoubted power of government to re-
strain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some
contracts.123
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls for the recognition of
the "equal and inalienable right of all members of the human family," "4
and under this umbrella includes the right to "life, liberty and security of
person'"' as well as the right to "periodic holidays with pay." 26 The
Declaration is silent, however, regarding conflicts between rights-for ex-
ample, when my right to security of person depends on the occasional
willingness of municipal firemen and policemen to alienate their right to
periodic holidays with pay.
Putting aside the language difficulty over the historical understanding
of Inalienable Rights and assuming broad agreement at the founding over
the meaning of that term, Amar is faced with a much more fundamental
problem. First, Amar's First Principles theory rests on an understanding
that the thirteen original colonies were, prior to their ratification of the
Constitution, independent sovereign states, but that after ratification, sover-
eignty shifted to the people of the nation as a whole.2' Thus, any under-
123 Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895). The Court continued:
[The government] may deny to all the right to contract for the purchase or sale of lottery tickets;
to the minor the right to assume any obligations, except for the necessaries of existence; to the
common carrier the power to make any contract releasing himself from negligence, and, indeed,
may restrain all engaged in any employment from any contract in the course of that employment
which is against public policy. The possession of this power by government in no manner con-
flicts with the proposition that, generally speaking, every citizen has a right freely to contract for
the price of his labor, services, or property.
Id. at 165-66; see also Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 90 (1890) ("The right to acquire, enjoy and
dispose of property is declared in the constitutions of several States to be one of the inalienable rights of
man. But this declaration is not held to preclude the legislature of any State from passing laws respect-
ing the acquisition, enjoyment and disposition of property."); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,
692 (1888) ("The right to procure healthy and nutritious food, by which life may be preserved and en-
joyed, and to manufacture it, is among these inalienable rights, which, in any judgment, no State can
give and no State can take away except in punishment for crime.").
124 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1,
183d plen. mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (Preamble).125 Id. at art. 3.
26 Id. at art. 24.
127 See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1062. Amar contends:
In 1787, each state was an independent nation. Thus, at that time, the relevant sovereign entity
in, say, Boston was the People of Massachusetts, and a bare majority of Massachusetts voters
could bind everyone in the State. But as I have argued at length elsewhere, after Massachusetts
adopted the Constitution, it lost its nationhood, and sovereignty was relocated to the People of
the United States, as a whole.
Id.; see also Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government, supra note 18, at 750 C'Because
each state was sovereign and independent prior to ratification [of the Constitution], popular sovereignty
took place within each state.").
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standing of First Principles must account for how, in the face of a theory of
inalienable majority rule/state sovereignty, the sovereignty of each former
colony was alienated when it ratified the Constitution. Amar offers this
explanation:
Popular sovereignty theory presupposes that at any given moment in time sov-
ereignty is vested in a unique set of electors, a majority of whom may speak for
the whole. One sovereign may lawfully12 lose its sovereignty only by irrevo-
cably transferring it to another sovereign entity or entities. Thus, sovereign in-
dividuals could (by unanimous mutual agreement) create a sovereign people,
which in turn could (by a majority vote) become part of some larger sovereign
people.'2
But this attempt by Amar to account for the alienated sovereignty of the
states seems contrived, an ad hoc attempt to fill a theoretical lacuna within
First Principles. Amar's view of majority rule would ask us to view the
following hypothetical as a consistent and coherent understanding of
popular sovereignty: In Delaware, prior to the adoption of the Constitution,
any provision of the Delaware Constitution that purported to bind a future
majority in any way must be considered per se invalid because a majority
may not in any way alienate the sovereignty of a future majority. For ex-
ample, an amendment to the Delaware Constitution that required a two-
thirds vote to raise taxes could at any time be removed by a simple majority
vote of Delaware citizens (even if the Delaware Constitution stated that a
three-fourths vote was necessary to remove such a rule) because even the
unanimous vote of the people of Delaware could not ever legitimately enact
a law that would bind future generations. A majority of the People must
always have the right to rule. However, in 1787 once the Delaware ratify-
ing convention voted by more than a majority to approve the new federal
Constitution, the state of Delaware forever alienated its sovereignty, and
the sovereignty of all future citizens of Delaware, to the people of the
United States as a whole. Thus, in the tax amendment example, the wishes
of 99% of the people of Delaware would not matter in the face of popular
sovereignty theory, but in the case of constitutional ratification, 50% plus
one controls.
Putting aside the original state sovereignty problem, Amar must over-
come yet another challenge. Having established that the right of the ma-
re Amar's use of the term "lawful" seems inconsistent with the vocabulary used to discuss first or-
der political theory. If the people are the sole and absolute authority, how can they act "unlawfully"?
That is, how can a sovereign "unlawfully" lose its sovereignty?
2 Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1062 n.69. In support of this proposition. Amar
cites Locke and Rousseau:
See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 95 (MacMillan. Thomas P. Peardon. cd,
1952) ("When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government.
they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic wherein the majority have a
right to act and conclude the rest."); Rousseau, Social Contract bk. I ch 6 at 60 ("These articles
of association, rightly understood, are reducible to a single one, namely the total alienation by
each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole community."); i&. at bk L ch 5 at 59
("The law of majority-voting itself rests on a covenant, and implies that there has been on at
least one occasion unanimity.").
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jority to rule is inalienable, is he not committed to the view that there can
be no restrictions on majority rule? That the right of the majority to rule is
absolute and unconditional?
Cleverly, Amar has decided that there are in fact areas where the ma-
jority may not rule. He maintains that freedom of speech may not be in-
fringed because it would undermine democratic legitimacy. Therefore, the
right to free speech must be considered part of the popular sovereignty
principle.'30 Similarly, no one would argue that the majority has the right to
deprive the minority of life or liberty simply because it is a majority. Thus,
we can place some fundamental rights on the same plane as majority rule,
such as the right of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness. While this argument is compelling, once competing rights are placed
on the same level, a rule is necessary to resolve conflicts between those
rights; but Amar does not address situations in which these rights conflict,
an omission that he fails to recognize is often solved by utilizing a Consti-
tution with supermajority provisions for amendment.
This gap is evident in Amar's dismissive treatment of instances where
he claims that majority rule is alienable. For example, to support his asser-
tion that "[e]ven Anti-Federalists shared [the] belief in majority rule as a
clear corollary of popular sovereignty[,]" 3' Amar adduces the Federal
Farmer: "So too, the Federal Farmer-perhaps the leading Anti-Federalist
pamphleteer--wrote that '[i]t will not be denied, that the people have a right
to change the government when the majorir chuse it, if not restrained by
some existing compact'--i.e. a valid treaty."
Note here Amar's appended id est at the end of the quotation. This
seems to have been included lest the reader think that the Federal Farmer
believed that the "existing compact" that might legitimately restrain the
rights of the majority to change their government could be a constitution.
But it is unclear whether Amar's interpretation of the Federal Farmer's nar-
rative is correct. Nonetheless, even limiting such an "existing compact" to
a treaty creates parallel difficulties. In Amar's world of pure majoritarian-
ism, notions of contractually binding obligations, whether created by treaty,
constitution, bond indenture, or otherwise, become terribly problematic. If
the majority cannot bind future majorities in a duly approved constitution,
how can it bind future generations at all, in a treaty or otherwise? And if,
as Amar seems to indicate, a majority can be bound by treaty, then why can
the majority not be bound by a constitution?
As Amar concedes, "[a]dmittedly, not even popular sovereignty can
avoid all forms of entrenchment." '33 Amar's list of approved restrictions
on majoritarianism includes a prohibition on infringing speech rights; re-
130 See id. at 1045 n.1 ("An amendment abolishing free speech might also be unconstitutional-re-
gardless of the mode of adoption-since abolition of speech would effectively immunize the status quo
from further constitutional revision .... ").
1 Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 485.
3 Id. at 485-86.
133 Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1073-74.
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quirements that proposed constitutional amendments be conditioned on a
deliberative process; M and a fixed definition of "the People" that can de-
cide certain procedural rules.'" But if these areas of the political process
can be entrenched, why not others? As one Amar critic has noted, "[w]hat
this amounts to... is that Amar seems prepared to permit 'We the Major-
ity' to amend only if he has no deep disagreement with the substance of the
amendment." " In the end, Amar seems to have developed a constitutional
political theory purportedly based on history that seems to have the conse-
quence of entrenching his own preference for liberal democracy.'"
14 See id. at 1064 n.79 ("A strong argument can be made that the People must in fact deliberate on a
proposed amendment rather than reflexively registering exogenous preferences-"). Amar further notes
that:
[tihe question of whether a petition could demand not a Philadelphia-style proposing conven-
tion, but simply a Congressionally-called referendum on a proposed amendment text specified in
the petition itself resembles the question discussed above: whether popular sovereignty requires
deliberative assemblies (conventions) at the ratification stage. My own tentative view is that.
since the amending majority must be deliberative, a convention may well be necessary for both
the proposing and ratification stages.
Id at 1066.
135 See id at 1074-76. Amar argues that
Fst, the substantive constitutional rules adopted by one generation remain the status quo de-
fault rules governing subsequent generations unless and until amended Howvever, if a subse-
quent, deliberate majority can in fact amend these default rules, then their failure to do so can
plausibly be seen as reflecting their implied consent. Since by definition, some status quo de-
fault rule must exist, resort to some form of implied consent argument is inescapable.
Second, the People in one generation must unavoidably entrench some definition of itself-
for example, "the sovereign People of Massachusetts" or "the sovereign People of America."
To argue that the boundaries of any definition are perhaps arbitrary (e.g., why are New
Mexicans "in" and Mexicans "out"?) is, however, to argue not simply with the theory of
popular sovereignty, but with the entire idea of the nation state.
In the end, the two types of entrenchment created by the Philadelphia Constitution's estab-
lishment of a status quo default rule and its definition of the People of the United States must be
seen as qualitatively different from the type of entrenchment that would arise from reading Arti-
cle V as exclusive. The first two types of entrenchment are unavoidable. Indeed, they are in-
dispensable to any workable system of popular sovereignty; the right of a majority of the People
to amend obviously presupposes these two types of entrenchment defining who gets to amend
what. The third (Article V) type of entrenchment, by contrast, would rip the heart out of this
fundamental right.
Id (emphasis in original omitted) (footnotes omitted).
Monaghan, supra note 31, at 176. Monaghan also points out that "Amar's other argumnts turn
out to have similar difficulties. He posits an 'unamendable' Constitution, i.e., he claims that certain
constitutional amendments must be rejected because they do not 'fit' the American constitutional or-
der." Id.
137 See Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 504-05. Amar also suggests:
[a] further turn of the screw: Article V, if exclusive, seems to say anything goes: no right is
immune from abandoment--except Senate equality and (prior to 1803) the slave trade. So
much follows from the logic of expressio unius and a blindered examination of Article V in
isolation. But these are the very flawed interpretive premises the "Frst Theorem" challenges.
Once we see the Constitution through, say, James Wdson's eyes, we see that perhaps not eve-
rything is properly amendable. Certain higher law principles--including popular sovereignty
majority rule, but encompassing other inalienable rights as well-frame Article V itself. If we
look at state declarations, we see, for example, that the individual "right of conscience" may,
like popular sovereignty itself, be "unalienable." Ordinary Government should arguably not be
allowed to amend this away--despite the fact that Article V itself says nothing explicit about
"conscience"-at least in the absence of a solemn Oudicial) declaration of the People them-
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V. MAJORITY RULE, THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION,
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF QUALIFIERS
One of the central justifications Amar employs for First Principles is
derived from the historical "Right of Revolution,"' an idea embedded in
the very concept of popular sovereignty/majority rule. According to Amar,
the Right of Revolution was recognized at the founding of the American
republic in 1776, but because of the unique nature and beliefs of the
American version of popular sovereignty/majority rule, this concept was
radically transformed by the Colonialists so that by the time of the drafting
of the Constitution in 1787 it had become more akin to a "Right of Revi-
sion"-the right of the People to peacefully alter their government at any
time and for any reason, from time to time as they saw fit. For Amar, the
newly constituted Right of Revision is a major foundational block in the
architecture of First Principles, a concept derived directly from our under-
standing of popular sovereignty and a cornerstone of the ideological foun-
dations of the American government.1
39
In order to appreciate Amar's derivative use of the Right of Revolution,
the concept must first be reviewed in the context of the ideological meta-
narrative employed by the revolutionary protagonists during the Colonial
struggle for independence. The Right of Revolution developed concur-
rently with democratic theory and the idea of limited governmental author-
ity. As discussed above, its premise is that any government acting against
the interests of the people is ipsofacto illegitimate, and under such circum-
stances the people have a right to alter or abolish such government. As
Amar correctly notes, at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the
Right of Revolution was not a dusty, ill-used concept existing only in the
history books; rather, it was employed by the English in the seventeenth
century against both Charles I and James II, and was invoked by the Colo-
nialists in 1776 as part of the ideological basis of the American Revolu-
tion.'4 The Right of Revolution takes its most familiar form to Americans
in the Declaration of Independence, one of the most salient expressions of
founding era political ideology:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that... Governments... deriv[e] their
just powers from the consent of the governed,-That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to
selves, in convention assembled, that they no longer judge conscience an "inalienable" right.
la'138 Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra notel 8, at 1435 (" [O]ne strand of Lockcan thought
had long recognized the inalienable (i.e., non-delegable) right of the People to alter or abolish their gov-
ernment through the exercise of the transcendent right of revolution-a right that the British People had
exercised in the seventeenth century, and that Americans invoked in 1776.").
139 See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18 (discussing First Principles).
140 See Alpheus T. Mason, America's Political Heritage: Revolution and Free Government--A Bi-centennial Tribute, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITION OF THE UNrTED STATES 1l, 12 (M. Judd Harmon
ed., 1978) (noting that Arthur Schlesinger Sr. lists the right of revolution as the top contribution of the
United States to civilization).
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alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.1
41
The Declaration of Independence was in large part a text concerned
with enumerating the abuses of the British Crown in order to demonstrate
that English rule of the Colonies had in fact become destructive of "these
ends"-life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Once such a case was
made to a candid world, the Colonialists felt they could legitimately invoke
the Right of Revolution to dissolve their political ties to Great Britain and
establish a new nation.
However, by incorporating the Right of Revolution into the theoretical
underpinnings of his First Principles theory, Amar faces a qualifier prob-
lem. The Right of Revolution does not exist as an absolute, but rather as a
contingency; it could only be invoked whenever a long train of abuses
made the government destructive of the ends for which it was designed.
On this point Locke and others were quite clear. As Jefferson noted in the
Declaration of Independence, "[p]rudence, indeed, will dictate that Gov-
ernments long established should not be changed for light and transient
causes," but only when "a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing
invariably the same Object[,] evinces a design to reduce them under abso-sl 141
lute Despotism .... Thus, the Right of Revolution as understood at the
end of the eighteenth century meant only that the people could alter or
abolish a government that had become illegitimate, not that a majority
could pass a constitutional amendment at any time on any subject (e.g., de-
claring Groundhog Day a national holiday). Again, many theorists, in-
cluding Locke, believed that the Right of Revolution could only be invoked
as a last resort-after all other avenues of reform had been tried and each
had failed to correct the abuses of the government.'
3
In order to use the Right of Revolution to support First Principles,
Amar must therefore find a way to separate the "for cause" qualifier from
the general theory allowing for a popular right of action. He attempts to
sunder the qualifier from its constructive base by seizing upon a subtle dif-
ference between Lockean and post-Revolutionary American political
thought:
Although sovereignty originally resided with the People, Locke suggested that
they had to "give [it] up" to government so that day-to-day order could be
maintained. The People could only reclaim their surrendered sovereignty-by
14' THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). Later in the text.
the Declaration provides: "But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the
same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty.
to throw off such Government. and to provide new Guards for their future security." Id; see also 1
JosEPH STORY, COMIENTARMS ON THE CONSTrIJOTION OF THE UNITED STATES 299-300 (Boston, Hil-
liard, Gray & Co. 1833) ("The declaration of independence ... puts the doctrine on its true grounds....
Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is a right of the people (plainly
intending, the majority of the people) to alter, or to abolish it ....").
142 THE DECLARATION OFINDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
'4' Locke emphasized that a resort to extra-legal force was not justified so long as alternative legal
recourse remained. See Wallach, supra note 58 and accompanying te.XL
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revolution-if government breached faith with the People by "act[ing] contrary
to their trust." In sharp contrast, the Americans came to believe that the People
never parted with their ultimate sovereignty. Rather, they delegated certain
sovereign powers to various governmental agents, but could revoke those dele-
gations, and reclaim those powers, at any time and for any reason.
The violent nature of revolution, it appears, induced Locke to limit strictly
the legitimate occasions for the exercise of the People's right to revolt. Ameri-
cans domesticated and defused violent revolution by channelling it into (rela-
tively) peaceful conventions. As a result, Americans could expand the People's
right to "revolt"-to alter or abolish their government-into a right that could
be invoked (by convention) on any occasion at the pleasure of the People.'4
For Amar, the differential locus of sovereignty between the Lockean
and American structures of government meant that for the Colonialists, the
Right of Revolution was expanded (that is, the "for cause" qualifier was
dissolved) and was transformed into a Right of Revision: an absolute right
to alter or amend the Constitution or change the form of government "on
any occasion at the pleasure of the People." 45 I will refer to this as Amar's
"differential sovereignty" theorem.' 46
It would be difficult to overstate how doctrinally weak this argument is,
and ordinarily it might be dismissed with a cursory analysis.'4 7 However,
because Amar has made it a critical component of his First Principles the-
ory, it must be afforded due consideration. Such an analysis can be per-
formed on two levels, one legal and theoretical, the other empirical and
practical.
First, assuming that the differential sovereignty theorem was factually
correct as a matter of political history, at a fundamental level such a theo-
rem is inherently weak because it attempts to draw an extremely fine dis-
tinction in an area of political ideology where there is, at best, only broad
agreement on abstract ideas and concepts. Like its modem counterpart,
eighteenth century political thought did not possess the objectivity of
Newtonian physics; considerable disagreement exists even today over what
Locke and the Framers meant when they wrote and spoke of inalienable
rights, majority rule, and popular sovereignty. Amar seems almost to con-
1 Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 18, at 1435 n.41 (emphasis in original omittcd)
(citations omitted).
145 Id.
146 See Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 475-76. Amar describes it thus:
For starters, there is of course the text of 1776 Declaration of Independence, which Publius
quoted, after shearing off its more limited Lockean language requiring a long train of govern-
ment abuse. Thus Madison in Number 43 placed the accent on Jefferson's broad phraseology of
a right to the people to amend "as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and hap-
piness," which Hamilton in Number 78 paraphrased as "the right of the people to alter or abol-
ish the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness." Like-
wise, Wilson stressed that by legalizing the right of revolution-through peaceful conventions-
Americans had broadened the right beyond Locke, invocable in the new world "whenever and
however [the People] please" to "increase the happiness of society."
Id.147 Amar's transition from a Right of Revolution to amendment at any time and for any reason is so
subtle that it has almost been lost on some commentators. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 24, at 856 (dis-
cussing Amar's theory as inclusive of the right of revolution, not an anytime, anywhere convenience).
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cede this point in the language he uses to discuss the differential sover-
eignty theorem-that Locke only "suggested" that sovereignty was trans-
ferred to the government (Was it?), and that as a result, Americans "could
expand" (But did they?) the Right of Revolution."' Amid such textual
equivocations, Amar asserts that the American version of sovereignty
stands in "sharp contrast" to the ideas of Locke.' Herein lies the diffi-
culty: at the level of distinction discussed by Amar, nothing stands in sharp
contrast to anything else; it's mostly gray; there is seldom black and white.
For example, is Amar talking here about Type I Sovereignty or Type II
Sovereignty? What about Locke? In this context, the theorem seems mud-
dled as a matter of historical understanding. Amar asks us to believe that
Locke thought sovereignty was originally generated in the People, and that
the People transferred that sovereignty to the government, with a right of
reversion conditioned on breach.tse Whereas the Americans stood "in sharp
contrast" to Locke because they believed that "the People never parted
with their ultimate sovereignty," they merely "delegated certain sovereign
powers to various governmental agents" with a right of reversion or revi-
sion for breach."' But this distinction is specious. When Americans dele-
gate sovereignty to their government, are they not "giving it up" as surely
as under Locke's theory? Aren't the people under Locke's theory retaining
a right of reversion? If so, is there any real distinction?
This discussion, however, seems inapposite in any event because the
pretensions of Amar's differential sovereignty theorem fail when the dis-
tinction between Type I Sovereignty and Type I Sovereignty is taken into
account. Like the Colonialists, Locke understood that the Right of Revolu-
tion meant that ultimate sovereignty-Type I Sovereignty-was retained
by the People.r Both the Colonialists and Locke thought that certain sov-
148 Amar recognizes elsewhere that the language of the founding era must be carefully read so as not
to impose modem day meanings and thus engender misinterpretations:
We must take care not to misunderstand Hamilton's last two words [regarding revolutions]. He
is speaking of the principles of the American Revolution, rather than of revolutionary as op-
posed to lawful principles. Indeed, the modem dichotomy between "revolutionary" and "le-
gal" is anachronistic to the extent it ignores the ways in which the Framers legitimated--and
recognized as lawful---certain kinds of popular revolutions through the device of conventions.
Amar, Philadelphia Revistied, supra note 18, at 1050 n.19.
149 Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 18. at 1435-36 & n.41.
IM It is clear that the language used by Locke, and in many instances his theories, differed from what
was later adopted by the Framers. For example, Locke stated that "there can be but one supreme power
which is the legislative." LocKE, supra note 44, at 84.
tu, Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 18, at 1435 n.41.
m While Locke did discuss the transfer of sovereignty to the legislature upon the formation of civil
society, many scholars believe that Locke probably understood that the Right of Revolution and other
inalienable rights meant that, as a practical matter, sovereignty was ultimately always vested in the Peo-
ple:
In his analysis of politics in terms of force as well as in terms of rightful authority Locke is
closer to the thought of our own day on the subject of sovereignty than he was to the assump-
tions of his own time. Behind the superior power of the legislative in his system there is always
to be seen the finally supreme, all-important power of the people themselves, again conceived of
as a force, though justified in its interferences once more by the concept of trust. ... [TIhis re-
sidual power must be called Locke's idea of what we not think of as popular sovereignty.
Peter Laslett, The Social and Political Tzeoyy of Two Treatises of Goveramrnt, in LOCKE, supra 
note
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ereign powers were transferred by the People to the government upon the
formation of civil society/ratification of a constitution. Both the Colonial-
ists and Locke thought that a breach of trust by the government was suffi-
cient justification for the People to revoke their delegation of author-
ity/sovereignty. While there are indeed distinctions between Lockean
thought and late eighteenth century American political theories, the type of
distinction that Amar attempts to draw on this particular point is simply not
meaningful. In reality, Amar's differential sovereignty theorem must fail
because there is no material difference in sovereignty as he applies it.
Rather, there are merely abstractions, inaccuracies, and misconceptions
over how the term "sovereignty" is employed, what it means, and how in
practice it is implemented. On a theoretical level, the differential sover-
eignty theorem seems little more than linguistic legerdemain-a superficial
political comparison cloaked in the garb of academic discourse.
Even if the above arguments are rejected, as a matter of practical appli-
cation the differential sovereignty theorem is still sophistry. Assuming ac-
curacy as a matter of theory, the shift from a Lockean based sovereignty
theory to the more populist American variant would be expected to produce
a considerable amount of debate in late eighteenth century political writ-
ings. In spite of the general fecundity of political discourse at the time of
the ratification of the Constitution and the early years of the American re-
public, however, Amar fails to cite any direct support for his theory that the
Framers recognized that the differential sovereignty theorem either was
meaningful with respect to the Right of Revolution, or that such a theorem
dissolved the "for cause" qualifier into a general rule of majoritarian action
along the lines of a Right of Revision.
The lack of any contemporaneous support for the shift away from the
Right of Revolution should be viewed against the background of the Colo-
nial period. Not only was the Right of Revolution employed by Jefferson
in the Declaration of Independence, but it was also inserted in a number of
the new state constitutions drafted and adopted during the same period. As
Amar notes, "Virginia's Declaration of Rights [was] the first and most in-
fluential of all the state declarations, adopted in June 1776, one month be-
fore Jefferson's Declaration [of Independence]." '53 Amar then cites Vir-
ginia's Declaration of Rights:
44, at 119. At least one commentator, however, disagrees:
Locke justified revolution with a theory that ordinarily required obedience. In some circum-
stances, according to Locke, the natural law of preservation permitted resistance to government:
"The Community perpetually retains a Supream Power of saving themselves from the attempts
and designs of any Body, even of their Legislators .... " Yet even though the natural law of
preservation sometimes justified revolution, it otherwise implied that "there can be but one Su-
preme Power, which is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate."
Having been established to preserve liberty, the legislative was "the Supream Power," and
therefore until the legislative breached its trust or government was otherwise dissolved, the en-
actments of the legislative had to be obeyed.
Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London
v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2137-38 (1994) (citations omitted).
153 Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 477.
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[W]hen any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these pur-
poses, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and inde-
feasable right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged
most conducive to the public weal'TM
Amar again cites Virginia's Declaration of Rights in another article:
Whenever any Government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these pur-
poses, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and inde-
feasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged
most condusive to the publick weal.
55
And the Massachusetts Constitution:
mhe people alone have an incontestible, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally chane the same, when
their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.
And the Maryland Constitution of 1776:
[Wlhenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly
endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may,
and of right ought, to reform the old or establish 
a new government.
Amar recites these "Right of Revolution" passages in the Colonial-era
Constitutions and then, in spite of the plain meaning of the italicized text,
asks us to draw the following conclusion: The "broad Federalist rejoinder,
then, stressed that, as a matter of first principles, the people of each state
retained the legal right to alter their government at any time and for any
reason." M
Since the Declaration of Independence and the above cited passages
represent the Right of Revolution writ large, Amar is ultimately forced to
concede that in 1776 the Colonialists explicitly acknowledged and invoked
this right to legitimize their separation from the Crown. Amar asserts,
however, that the popular sovereignty narrative of the founding em evolved
between 1776 and 1787 by gradually incorporating the differential sover-
eignty theorem, so that by the time of the drafting of the Constitution in
1787, the Right of Revision was widely acknowledged by the Framers:
But once the Revolution succeeded, Americans re-Constituted their colo-
nial governments on purely democratic rather than monarchical founda-
tions.... [O]ver the next decade the previously revolutionary right to alter and
abolish became domesticated and legalized in each of the thirteen former colo-
t Id. (quoting VA. CoNsT. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights). preamble § 3 (alteration in original)).
,55 Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1051 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration
of Rights), art. 3). This antiquated constitution was reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CoNSTITUtIoN 3
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
M Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1051 (quoting MASS. CoxsT. of 1780. pt. 1. art.
VII) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
L MD. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), art. IV, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 1687 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).= Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 481 (emphasis added); see also 1 DAVID
RAstsAY, THE HISTORY OF THE AmERICAN REVOLUTION 451-52 (Trenton, James J. Wilson 1811) (It
is true, from the infancy of political lmowledge in the United States. there were many defects in their
[state] forms of government. But in one thing they were all perfect. They left the people in the power
of altering and amending them, whenever they pleased.").
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nies. Ballots would replace bullets, and the People could exercise this right not
simply (as Jefferson's initial phrase could be read to imply) "whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of [its] ends" by violating unalien-
able rights, but at any time and for any reason that the People (by majority
vote) deemed sufficient. By 1787, the accent had shifted to Jefferson's more
expansive clause stressing the People's power to institute new Governments as
"to them"-not anyone else, not a king, not the world-" shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
By 1787, the transition was complete. The Constitution needed no long
train of abuses by state governments to justify itself, and recited none. In con-
trast to the Declaration, it submitted itself to a peaceful popular vote in each
state, under principles of majority rule."3 9
Amar concludes that by 1787 "the transition was complete" because of
how the Constitution was ratified, that is, peacefully by majoritarian action
in specially called state ratifying conventions.' Thus, it is critical for
Amar's First Principles to establish that by the time of the drafting of the
Constitution in 1787, the Right of Revolution had become fully trans-
formed into a Right of Revision.
But Amar has a problem he does not seem to want to face. The first
real test of his differential sovereignty theorem occurred in 1790, after the
Constitution had been ratified and the first Congress had been elected and
convened.' 6' During the debates over the proposed Constitution, many of
its proponents had promised the early adoption of a bill of rights to ensure
individual liberties as soon as the new government was constituted. As part
of a proposed Bill of Rights, James Madison introduced an amendment that
would have codified the Right of Revolution by placing it in the Preamble
of the new Constitution. Amar discusses this point in two articles, one
published in 1988 and the other in 1994. Consider the exact wording from
each of Amar's articles when he discusses the amendment proposed by
Madison:
One of Madison's proposed amendments to the Constitution was to append a
prefix to the Preamble declaring "That the people have an indubitable, unalien-
able, and indefeasible right to reform or change their Government . . 162
One of [Madison's] proposals was to append a prefix to the Preamble which in-
cluded the following: "That the people have an indubitable, unalienable and
159 Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 463-64 (citations omitted).
160 See id. at 464 (" [I]ndividual states echoed the Declaration of 1776 and extended it, giving the
people's right to alter or abolish a precise, regular, peaceful, and legal form that it lacked before 1776.
Sovereignty... could be exercised peacefully by simple majorities at the polls and in special popular
assemblies/conventions.").
161 Other actions that call into questions Amar's assertion regarding the Right of Revolution pre-
ceded Madison's proposed amendment. At the Virginia ratifying convention, it was noted that "[tlhe
powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be re-
sumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression." Amar, The
Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 492 (emphasis added).
162 A " R s "Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1057.
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indefeasible right to reform or change their Government ..... 3
Then consider the full wording of Madison's proposal without Amar's ex-
clusion of text:
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to re-
form or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate
to the purposes of its institution.'"
Here in 1790, as demonstrated by James Madison, one of the key fig-
ures in the founding of the republic, is the Right of Revolution with its at-
tendant qualifier. Surely if the Right of Revolution had been transformed
into a Right of Revision by 1787 as Amar claims, Madison's proposal in
1790 would have omitted the "for cause" qualifier. The convenient em-
ployment of ellipses dose not hide this simple fact.'6
VI. AMAR AND DORR'S REBELLION
In an attempt to bolster his claim for First Principles, Amar offers his-
torical evidence to demonstrate how earlier generations considered popular
sovereignty as more closely akin to First Principles and less similar to the
modem received orthodoxy that today seems to proscribe Article V exclu-
sivity. One such event is Dorr's Rebellion, a dispute in the 1840s over the
legitimacy of competing Rhode Island state governments. While a cursory
review of Amar's arguments in light of the rhetoric surrounding Dorr's Re-
bellion might initially seem to lend support to First Principles, a closer look
at Amar's account of the rebellion does little to legitimize a First Principles
reading of mid-nineteenth century American political history.
In 1841, the Rhode Island Constitution was essentially the charter
granted to the Rhode Island colony by King Charles II in 1633."t Not sur-
prisingly, its structure favored the landholders of the state, and because it
lacked any provision for amendment or revision, it essentially entrenched a
propertied ruling class who resisted all attempts at governmental reform.
In December of 1841, Thomas Dorr and his followers assembled in Rhode
Island and adopted what they declared to be a "fair and democratic" con-
stitution, and Dorr was elected the new Governor. In response, the existing
163 Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10. at 491.
164 Resolution of James Madison (June 8. 1789). in CREATNIG THE BILL OF RIGTrrs: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11-12 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds.. 1991)
(empshasis added).
I Other scholars have made the same mistake. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 40. at 203 n.53
("Locke maintains that the people's delegation of sovereign power is always revocable whenever thc
people wish to revoke it."). This is an overly broad reading of Locke. In the Two Treatises passages
cited, Locke is quite clear that any alteration by the people must be conditioned on prior inappropriate
actions by the government. See John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment. 42 EMORY L.
967, 972 (1993) ("Indeed, James Madison's unadopted First Amendment emphasized the popular sov-
ereignty meaning of political 'rights' and 'the people': 'Mhe people have an indubitable, unalienable.
and indefeasible right to reform or change their Government."') (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Jo-
seph Gales ed., 1789)) (alteration in original).
6 See Luther v. Bordon, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 1 (1849). In 1776, the Rhode Island Constitution was
revised to remove references to the Crown. but its substantive provisions remained intact.
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Rhode Island government-the "charter government" -adopted a revised
constitution and submitted it to the state for approval. Although Dorr's
constitution received 14,000 votes, and the charter government's effort
only garnered 7,000, the charter government's document nonetheless pre-
vailed, for both procedural and political reasons (then-President John Tyler
supported the chartists). When Dorr was arrested, he claimed immunity
from prosecution as the rightful governor of the State. The case went to the
Supreme Court, which declined to intervene and ruled that the legitimacy
of competing state governments was a non-justiciable political question
under the Guaranty Clause.'67
Amar's account of Dorr's Rebellion implies that most of the parties to
the dispute recognized the fundamental right of a majority to establish, al-
ter, or abolish the government of a state and that Dorr's efforts failed partly
because the processes of adopting the rival Constitution were faulty. Thus,
Amar asks us to view Dorr's Rebellion as a window on mid-nineteenth
century political thought that reveals a general sympathy during the period
for a First Principles reading of popular sovereignty/majority rule theory.
However, Amar's comparative is deficient on a number of levels. First,
the events surrounding Dorr's Rebellion simply cannot, without more, be
analogized to the ordinary amending of a constitution at the pleasure of a
majority. Dorr's efforts essentially represented an exercise of the Right of
Revolution, the right of a majority of citizens to effect changes in their
government whenever such government has lost its legitimacy-that is,
when it fails to act in the interests and promote the well-being of its citi-
zenry. In essence, Dorr and his supporters had cause. The illiberalism of
the Rhode Island Constitution in 1841 was legend; it was a document that
had remained essentially unchanged for more than 200 years, it was origi-
nally granted by a King, it did not provide a mechanism for its revision,
and it entrenched a favored class of citizens through malapportionment and
other devices (e.g., only the eldest sons of property owners were allowed to
vote).1'6 Dorr and his supporters were not merely offering textual im-
provements to a state constitution (e.g., a Groundhog Day amendment),
they were attempting "to overthrow the tyrannous rule of the landholding
classes who were still entrenched behind the King's charter." " Amar's
attenuated comparison of Dorr's Rebellion (an attempt to ratify a new state
constitution) to the ordinary amending of a constitution (e.g., the Ground-
hog Day amendment) strains the very concept of an analogy.
Amar also offers quotations from the oral arguments of Dorr's lawyer
before the Supreme Court, who, not surprisingly, peppered his presentation
to the Court with the rhetoric of majority rule/popular sovereignty and the
167 See i at 42.
16s See generally DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUrHs: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLrICS
SINCE INDEPENDENCE 102-06 (1987) (discussing the Rhode Island contest, known as the "Dorr War").
169 Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government, supra note 18, at 775 (citing ROGER S.
HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS 21-22 (1917)).
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right of a majority to alter its govemment 70  But as is typical of much po-
litical discourse, the underlying nature of such rhetoric is often opaque, in-
consistent, or self-serving. For example, while Dorr's lawyers did at times
seem to offer clear support for Amar's First Principles theory,"' they also
employed the "for cause" language when invoking the Right of Revolu-
tion -- a notion that, according to Amar, became irrelevant to the Ameri-
can political system sometime between 1776 and 1787. Further, Dorr's
lawyers seemed to suggest the alienability of popular sovereignty by citing
authority that supports the idea of the people placing limits on their sover-
eignty.
73
Amar cites a letter from John Whipple, a leading Chartist at the time,
that was sent to President Taylor in support of the Chartist's efforts to re-
tain control of the Rhode Island government. The Whipple letter reference
seems to imply that Whipple believed that the legitimacy of the Rhode Is-
land government should be judged by its level of support among a majority
of the people of Rhode Island."' It is unclear exactly why Amar included a
portion of Whipple's letter in his work; it seems to be an attempt to imply
that even the Chartist leaders understood or were sympathetic to First Prin-
ciples. But in his oral argument before the Supreme Court as the attorney
for the Chartists, Whipple would clearly not have agreed with Amar's con-
ception of popular sovereignty:
But it is urged by the opposite counsel, that the great doctrine of the sover-
eignty of the people, and their consequent power to alter the constitution when-
ever they choose, is the American doctrine.... I say that a proposition to
amend always comes from the legislative body.
171 See i&4 at 777.
17 Dorr's lawyers argued two points that, while not utilized by Amar. seem to directly support his
First Principles theory:.
That the great body of the people may change their form of government at any tim, in any
peaceful way, and by any mode of operations that they for themselves determine to be expedi-
ent.
That even where a subsisting constitution points out a particular mode of change, the people
are not bound to follow the mode so pointed out; but may at their pleasure adopt another.
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at23.
17 See id. at 18-19 ("And that when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to [the
benefit of the people], a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible
right to reform, alter, or abolish the same, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the
public weal.") (emphasis added).
'7 See i& at 22. The Court observed that:
[t]he English authors already cited, although they all assert the right of the people to change
their form of government as they please for their own welfare, do not in any instance come
nearer to pointing out any specific mode of doing it than by saying that "they may meet when
and where they please, and dispose of the sovereignty, or limit the exercise of it."
Id. (emphasis added).
174 To wit
[The issue is w]hether their constitution shall be carried out by force of arms, without a major-
ity; or the present government be supported until a constitution can be agreed upon that will
command a majority ... Nearly all the leaders, who are professional men, have abandoned
them, on the ground that a majority is not in favor of their constitution.
Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government, supra note 18, at 775-76 (quoting WVLtA.t%,t M.
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTIoN. 96 (1972)) (quoting letter of John
Whipple, Leader of the Chartists, to President John Tyler (Apr. 9, 1842)) (alteration in original).
Apr. 2000]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
... [According to the federal Constitution,] [s]ixteen millions [sic] of peo-
ple in the large States may be in favor of amending the Constitution, but their
will may be thwarted by four millions [sic] in the small States. What then be-
comes of this vaunted American doctrine of popular sovereignty, acting by
majorities? 75
Further, Daniel Webster, Whipple's co-counsel before the Court, implicitly
rejected Amar's theories out-of-hand and all but offered a legal brief
against First Principles:
[It is my understanding] that the people are the source of all political
power. Every one believes this .... [But another] principle is, that the people
often limit their government; another, that they often limit themselves. They
secure themselves against sudden changes by mere majorities. The fifth article
of the Constitution of the United States is a clear proof of this. The necessity of
having a concurrence of two thirds of both houses of Congress to propose
amendments, and of their subsequent ratification by three fourths of the States,
gives no countenance to the principles of the Dorr men, because the people
have chosen so to limit themselves.
In his discussion of Dorr's Rebellion, Amar states that:
In any event, putting [the] justiciability issues [of the Guaranty Clause in Lu-
ther v. Bordon] to one side, let us recall what the Luther Court said on the mer-
its, about the principles underlying the Republican Government Clause, and the
Constitution generally: "No one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition,
that, according to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every State
resides in the people of the State, and that they may alter and change their form
of government at their own pleasure."'77
However, it seems an overstatement to suggest that the Supreme
Court's language in Luther was a statement "about the principles underly-
ing the Republican Government Clause, and the Constitution generally."
This language from Luther comes just a few sentences after the Court de-
clared that many of the arguments "turned upon political rights and politi-
cal questions, upon which the court has been urged to express an opinion.
We decline doing so.",
78
Here as elsewhere, Amar seems to selectively cull rhetoric regarding
the right of the majority to rule in an effort to imply broad historical sup-
175 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 28.
176 Id. at 29-30. Further proof of Webster's opposition to First Principles comes when he argues that
no one proposed an alternative to the sober, calculated method used to amend the Constitution:
It has been said by the opposing counsel, that the people can get together, call themselves so
many thousands, and establish whatever government they please. But others must have the
same right. We have then a stormy South American liberty, supported by arms to-day and
crushed by arms to-morrow. Our theory places a beautiful face on liberty, and makes it power-
ful for good, producing no tumults. When it is necessary to ascertain the will of the people, the
legislature must provide the means of ascertaining it. The Constitution of the United States was
established in this way. It was recommended to the States to send delegates to a convention.
They did so. Then it was recommended that the States should ascertain the will of the people.
Nobody suggested any other mode.
Id. at 30-31.
177 Amar, Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, supra note 18, at 777 (quoting Luther,
48 U.S. (7 How.) at 47).
1 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 46-47.
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port for his First Principles theory. But a careful reading of history dis-
solves many of the historical references and rhetorical snippets Amar of-
fers, leaving one to conclude that we may indeed have been looking
through the right end of the telescope all along.
VII. AMAR AND HISTORY
Because Amar is a neo-originalist, much of his work depends on min-
ing the historical record of the founding era in an attempt to excavate ar-
chival support for First Principles. In presenting his findings, Amar argues
forcefully that First Principles was an idea that was widely understood at
the time of the founding. A detailed analysis of all of Amar's historical
references is beyond the scope of this Article, but I have selected three in-
stances-Amar's use of the writings of James Wilson, his references to the
Anti-Federalists, and a citation to the Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury
v. Madison-where I believe Amar fails to properly contextualize or rigor-
ously analyze the work being cited.
A. James Wilson
In making his First Principles argument, Amar relies heavily on quota-
tions from James Wilson, a leading Colonial politician who served as a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, was a signatory to the Declara-
tion of Independence, and founded the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Wilson is a rich source for Amar because he often spoke the lan-
guage of strict majoritarianism: the right of the majority to conclude deci-
sions, amend the Constitution, and do whatever else it pleased.' As such,
Amar heaps heavy praise on Wilson, declaring him to have been "univer-
sally regarded as perhaps the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer
in America." "s What Amar fails to emphasize is that James Wilson was an
ardent nationalist; at the Convention he repeatedly argued against equal
representation in the Senate and wanted a strong federal government with
only a limited, "local" role to be played by the states. 8' It is therefore im-
portant to remember-in an effort to keep Wilson's majoritarian rhetoric in
context-that Wilson's preferred version of the federal government was not
the one that was adopted at the Convention and ratified by the states. As
evidence of the general majoritarian Zeitgeist at the founding, Amar cites
1 See James Wilson, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11. 1787). in 2 THE
DOCUMIENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrtTON 550.555 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saldino eds., 1984) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ("This ... is not a government
founded upon compact; it is founded upon the power of the people."); id. at 382-83 ("Those who or-
dain and establish have the power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul."); Version of Wilson's
Speech by Thomas loyd (Nov. 24, 1787), in supra, at 350. 362 (" [Tihe people may change the con-
stitutions whenever and however they please.").
1W Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 474.
See ANDERSON, supra note 45, at 7, 113 (analyzing the Constitutional Convention and dividing
the delegates into an ideological tripartite, with James Wilson as a 
" strong nationalist").
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extensively from Wilson's remarks arguing in favor of a governmental
structure that was ultimately rejected by the Framers. Amar seems to slight
the fact that the "Framers" were by no means homogenous in their politi-
cal beliefs, and merely finding one Framer, such as James Wilson, who of-
ten argued for a general right of majoritarian action does little to legitimize
an accurate reading of history. While Wilson may have been sympathetic
to First Principles, Amar's weakness is that he seems to imply that we
should therefore believe that the Framers in general were so inclined. This
is a subtle association underlying much of Amar's work that is ultimately
unsupported in fact and does not seem to be a valid interpretive method of
historical scholarship.
Additionally, a cursory review of founding era texts reveals that Wil-
son, although clearly nationalistic, was by no means an absolute majori-
tarian; he voted a number of times at the Convention in favor of the inclu-
sion of supermajority rules in the Constitution. Ironically, in light of
Amar's argument, it was Convention delegate James Wilson who strongly
supported the supermajority voting requirements of Article V.'812 And while
Wilson's majoritarian rhetoric may fit snugly within Amar's First Princi-
ples tent, it is interesting to note that one of the key ideas upon which Amar
constructs his First Principles theory seems to have been rejected by Wil-
son during the Convention. Amar bases First Principles, in part, on the no-
tion that at the time of the ratification of the Constitution the thirteen colo-
nies were acting as independent, sovereign states; a concept rejected during
the Convention."
The revolutionary rhetoric of individuals such as Wilson must be con-
sidered in the context in which it was made-as part of the formation of a
new government and not a comprehensive treatise on political theory. '
192 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 80, at 558-60. During the Constitutional Convention, Roger Sherman
of Connecticut made a motion to add a unanimity requirement to Article V. However, James Wilson
intervened, first moving for a two-thirds requirement, which failed 5-6; he then moved to insert the
three-fourths requirement, and the motion passed unanimously. See id.
For additional critical analysis of Amar's use of James Wilson's rhetoric, see Monaghan, supra
note 31, at 157-59.
183 See 2 DEBATES, supra note 80, at 590.
Mr. Wilson, could not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies became independent of Great
Britain, they became independent also of each other. He read the declaration of Independence,
observing thereon that the United Colonies were declared to be free and independent States and
inferring that they were independent, not individually but unitedly, and that they were confeder-
ated, as they were independent States.
Id. But see James Wilson, James Wilson's Opening Address, in 1 ANTI-FEDERALIsT PAPERS, supra
note 76, at 791, 791 (describing the Colonies at the time of the drafting of the Constitution as "thirteen
Independent and Sovereign States").
In the convention, on November 28, Thomas McKean said: "If, sir, the people should at any
time desire to alter and abolish their government, I agree with my honorable colleague [James Wilson]
that it is in their power to do so, and I am happy to observe that the Constitution before us provides a
regular mode for that event." Thomas McKean, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28,
1787), in 2 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 179, at 382, 387. Note that McKean implies that the
Article V power is a power of the people. This undercuts Amar's claim that contemporary understand-
ing distinguished sharply between the people's right to change the Constitution and government-
controlled change via Article V. See Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 458-61.
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When Wilson announced that the people "retain the right of abolishing,
altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and in whatever
manner, they shall deem it expedient," ' did he mean that the majority may
enact amendments at odds with liberal notions of democracy, such as an
amendment that would suppress political speech or curtail equal protec-
tion? What if the majority wants a supermajority rule? If a majority can-
not enact a supermajority rule, can it be said to have the authority to amend
its constitution in "whatever manner" it shall deem expedient?
Finally, during the Pennsylvania ratification debates, Wilson stated (di-
rectly counter to First Principles theory) that Pennsylvania's state constitu-
tion "cannot be amended by any other mode than that which it directs,"'16
and that if in amending a constitution the majority infringes "the act of
original association" or violates "the intention of those who united under
if' then the minority is "not obliged to submit to the new government." m'
Thus, James Wilson-whom Amar concedes to be one of the "most bril-
liant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer[s]" in Colonial America--seems to
have often been supportive of positions that are directly contrary to First
Principles.
B. The Anti-Federalists
In making his case for First Principles, Amar also offers rhetorical
scraps from a number of Anti-Federalist writings in an apparent effort to
imply a general sympathy on the part of the Anti-Federalists to his First
Principles theory. As Amar states: "[e]ven Anti-Federalists shared this
[First Principles] belief in majority rule as a clear corollary of popular sov-
ereignty." 1
However, a close reading of the Anti-Federalists' vritings does little to
support Amar's claim that they were sympathetic to First Principles. In ar-
guing against the proposed Constitution, the Anti-Federalists harshly criti-
cized Article V for being so restrictive as to be impractical, an argument
obviously premised on an understanding that Article V was to be the exclu-
sive means of altering the new Constitution:
And after the constitution is once ratified, it must remain fixed until two thirds
of both the houses of Congress shall deem it necessary to propose amendments;
or the legislatures of two thirds of the several states shall make application to
Congress for the calling a convention for proposing amendments .... This ap-
pears to me to be only a cunning way of saying that no alteration shall ever be
185 James Wilson, Of the Study of the Lov in the United States. in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
69, 77 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter WORKS].
18 2 DEBATES, supra note 80, at 457 (statement of James Wilson). Cf Amar, The Consent of the
Governed, supra note 10, at 481 (asserting that the clause in the Pennsylvania state constitution that
provided for amendments was non-exclusive, but merely added "an additional mode of amendment
without in any way limiting the people's pre-existing background right to alter or abolish" it).
197 James Wilson, Of Government, in WORKS, supra note 185. at 284. 304.
193 Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 474.
" Id. at485.
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made; so that whether it is a good constitution or a bad constitution, it will re-
main forever unamended .... mhe proposed constitution holds out a prospect
of being subject to be changed if it be found necessary or convenient to change
it; but the conditions upon which an alteration can take place [the provisions of
Article V], are such as in all probability will never exist. The consequence will
be that, when the constitution is once established, it never can be altered or• 190
amended without some violent convulsion or civil war.
This passage is all but a rebuttal to Amar's First Principles argument.
If, as Amar seems to suggest, it was widely acknowledged during the late
eighteenth century that a majority of the people could alter or amend their
constitutional government from time to time at their pleasure, wouldn't the
Anti-Federalists' argument have been received as disingenuous and logi-
cally faulty-or, perhaps more likely, as risibly misguided? Wouldn't the
Federalists have publicly ridiculed it on those very grounds?
Another interesting passage from the Anti-Federalists notes that the
Constitution provides for the new Congress to determine the time, place,
and manner of elections:
[S]uppose they [Congress] should think it for the publick good, after the first
[presidential] election, to appoint the first Tuesday of September, in the year
two thousand, for the purpose of chusing the second President; and by law em-
power the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to act as President until
that time. However disagreeable it might be to the majority of the States, I do
not see but that they are left without a remedy, provided four States should be
satisfied with the measure. 191
Although admittedly a somewhat bizarre hypothetical, the Anti-
Federalists are arguing that under the structure of the proposed Constitu-
tion, if Congress abuses its time, place, and manner authority, and four
states (the number then required to block a constitutional amendment) ac-
quiesce to that abuse, there is no corrective remedy available. Thus, Con-
gress and four states could provide for a presidential term of 211 years, and
the remaining states would be powerless in the face of constitutional rigid-
ity. This argument must logically proceed from an assumption that Article
V is the exclusive method of amending the Constitution, and thus is clearly
contrary to a First Principles understanding that the people can amend the
Constitution at any time they see fit. And these are not the only examples;
time and again the Anti-Federalists argued against the new Constitution on
the grounds that Article V's amendment procedure presented such a hurdle
to change that the Constitution would be all but unamendable." I have
been unable to find a single historical source in which these assertions were
countered with the argument that the people could simply circumvent the
190 George Bryan et al., "An Old Whig" , INDEP. GAZETEER, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 1 ANTI-
FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 76, at 122, 122-23.
191 Letter from a Customer, CUMBERLAND GAZErTE (Mar. 1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIsT 202-03 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
19 See, e.g., Samuel Bryan, Reply to Wilson's Speech: "Centinel" 11, FREEMAN's JOURNAL (Oct.
24, 1787), reprinted in ANTI-FEDERAUST PAPERS, supra note 76, at 77, 90 (arguing that Article V is so
restrictive that it will require "a general and successful rising of the people" in order to amend the Con-
stitution).
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textual requirements of Article V by a simple majority vote.
In fact, historical evidence against First Principles is widely available to
the diligent reader. For example, upon reading Article V in the proposed
constitution, Patrick Henry announced that "[t]he way to amendment, is, in
my conception, shut." 93 During a lengthy discussion at the Virginia con-
vention, Henry decried the fact that a "bare majority" in "four small
States" containing "one-twentieth part of the American people" might
"prevent the removal of the most grievous inconveniences and oppression,
by refusing to accede to amendments." "4
But if, as Amar has argued, "the founding generation understood that
the People were legally incapable of alienating their future legal right to
alter or abolish their Constitution at any time and for any reason," 5 how
are we to understand these Anti-Federalist arguments? 6 Consider the
above arguments presented by the Anti-Federalists in the context of Amar's
assertion that "[e]ven Anti-Federalists shared this [First Principles] belief
in majority rule as a clear corollary of popular sovereignty" '-the right of
a majority of the people to alter the constitution "at any time and for any
reason."
C. Marbury v. Madison
Consider yet another example where Amar seems to employ a selective
reading of history to support his First Principles cause. Amar cites Mar-
bury v. Madison"93 a number of times in what appears to be an effort to
show broad support for First Principles during the post-founding era. But
consider how strategically Amar crafted the following citation from Mar-
bury for inclusion in his writings:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness,
is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected.... This
original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different
departments their respective powers ... [and may] establish certain limits not
to be transcended by those departments.
To a reader without the full text of the Marbury opinion available, this
language does seem to offer broad support for First Principles. Indeed, the
quotation from Marbury would seem to invest First Principles with the le-
gitimacy of one of the most important cases ever decided by the Supreme
Court. However, consider again Justice Marshall's words in Marbury, this
time including the text that Amar omits (indicated below in italics):
'9 Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788). in 9 DoCUrM'NARY
HISTORY, supra note 179, at 943, 955.
'94 Id.
'9 Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1067.
'96 This question is nearly identical to one Amar poses with respect to Article IV. See idt
197 Amar, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 485.
19 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
199 Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 18, at 1451 n.103 (alterations in original).
Apr. :2000]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL L4W
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness,
is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise
of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be fre-
quently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed finda-
mental: and as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can sel-
dom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to
different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or es-
tablish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
This passage illustrates what can be accomplished through a selective
citation of historical material and the convenient use of ellipses. 0 ' The text
omitted from this passage is neither extraneous nor non-germane to the dis-
cussion; in fact, it speaks four-square against First Principles. Chief Justice
Marshall was discussing a conception of popular sovereignty that he be-
lieved was foundational and that should therefore be seldom exercised, not
one that would allow Groundhog Day amendments at any time at the
pleasure of a simple majority.'
VIII. COMPETING PRINCIPLES AND THE ARGUMENT FROM UTILITY
Absent from much of Amar's discussion of First Principles is a recon-
ciliation of the competing interests of a majority. Amar seems to view the
majority's desire to enact constitutionally binding supermajority rules as an
illegitimate exercise of authority inconsistent with higher principles of
popular sovereignty. However, supermajority rules are not merely a means
for one generation to foist its subjective preferences upon future genera-
tions. Rather, there can be a significant advantage to supermajority rules in
the political context, just as there are for binding contracts in the commer-
cial context. Although paternalistic, the ability to bind oneself is not with-
out individual benefit and social utility.'
What Amar seems to slight is that the very notion of a Constitution pre-
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175.
201 When using ellipses "in quoted material, the author should take great care to avoid altering the
meaning of the original." THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE, Rule 10.63 (Faithful Elision) (14th ed.
1993).
See also William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE LJ. 1,18 (arguing that Article V must be understood to negate other conceivable modes of amendment).
See Sullivan, supra note 118, at 1480. Sullivan writes that:
[m]aking constitutional rights inalienable because citizens may undervalue the worth of those
rights to themselves would be classic paternalism overruling individuals' choices for their own
good. Individuals' choices may diverge from their "best" interests for many reasons: for ex-
ample, because they underassess risk or undervalue their long-term interests. Choices to waiveconstitutional rights are no exceptions; invalidating such choices, even if perfectly voluntary,
compels citizens to hang onto their rights for their own good.
Il (citation omitted). For a more complete analysis of paternalism in socio-legal doctrine, see Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); David L. Shapiro,
Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 573 & n.236 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Le-
gal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
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supposes that certain rights are alienable because a Constitution exists to
limit choices in order to preserve individual rights and increase collective
utility. Just as Amar concedes that the right of free speech may be so
fundamental to a democracy that it is beyond the right of a majority of the
people to restrict it, so too are other rights that were placed beyond the
ability of a majority to alter or abolish. That is, "the entrenchment of es-
tablished institutional arrangements enables rather than merely constrains
present and future generations by creating a settled framework under which
people may make decisions '' 0 and can enhance the deliberative process on
important public policy issues.
The notion that supermajority rules contain inherent utility does in fact
make Amar's First Principles argument even more problematic (and im-
poverished). If "all power is in the people," then the people must have the
ability to craft "a government as a majority of them thinks will promote
their happiness."' m But Amar would seem to limit the majority by exclud-
ing all option sets containing supermajority rules, foreclosing precommit-
ment strategies that are both rational and utility-enhancing.
'
24 See generally HoLmES, supra note 66, at 5-6; Katz, supra note 5. at 252-54. Additionally, Amar
admits (but does not rationalize or harmonize) the presence of terms in the Massachusetts, Pennsylva-
nia, and New Hampshire Constitutions that explicitly limited early amendments and are therefore 
at
odds with his First Principles theory. See Amar, 77Te Consent ofrhe Governed, supra note 10, at 481-82
& n.84.
20 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHL. L REV. 633, 639 (1991). Consti-
tutionalism refers to limits on majority decisions; more specifically, to limits that are in some sense self-
imposed. See generally Holmes, supra note 8; Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself 
J. L
ECON. ORG., Fall (1985), at 357.
2M See Brenner v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 315 F. Supp. 627, 632 n.7 (W.D. Mo. 1970). In
Brenner, the court notes cases of extraordinary majority requirements:
See State ex reL Dobbins v. Sutherfield, (1878).54 Mo. 391, involving the attempted removal of
a county seat; State ex rel. Litson v. McGowan, (1897) 138 Mo. 187,39 S.W. 771, involving the
adoption of a township form of county government; and State v. Winkelmcier, 35 Mo. 103
(1864), involving the sale of beer on Sunday, for examples of extraordinary majority require-
ments which Missouri selected for the determination of questions which simply would not stay
decided unless the ground rules provided were calculated to demonstrate that the proposed ac-
tion had the broad support of a large number of all the citizens in the community.
Id. The court also explained that
[a] two thirds majority requirement, and requirements of a similar nature, reflect a policy deter-
mination on the part of a particular State that a greater consensus than a bare majority of the eli-
gible voters who usually vote in school referendum elections must be obtained before recon-
mended governmental action in connection with the school bonds and school levies is approved.
Id. at 633; see also Contest of a Certain Special Election v. Special Rd. Dists., 659 P.2d 1294, 
1297
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that "a state has an interest in providing for a broader consensus for sub-
stantial public indebtedness than a bare majority of what perhaps might be a small minority"); Bogert 
v.
Kinzer, 465 P.2d 639, 648 (Idaho 1970) (citing Misreading Democracy. NEV REFUBUC, Sept. 
27,
1969, at 9, 10, which argued that state power should not rigidly adhere to the majoritarian principle 
"so
that government may rest on widespread consent rather than teetering on the knife-edge of a transient
51 grcent" ).
4 DEBATES, supra note 80, at 161.
Sunstein describes the benefits of constitutional precommitment strategies:
[Clonstitutional precommitment strategies might serve to overcome myopia or weakness of will
on the part of the collectivity, or to ensure that representatives follow the considered judgments
of the people. Protection of freedom of speech, or from unreasonable searches and seizures,
might represent an effort by the people themselves to provide safeguards against the impulsive
behavior of majorities. Here the goal is to ensure that the deliberative sense of the community
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Additionally, as noted above, supermajority rules are one part of a
structure employed by the Framers to address conflicts in competing first
order principles. We can say that majority rule is fundamental to democ-
racy, but so too are free speech, due process, and the maintenance of a
neutral political framework. Clearly, when implementing these and other
first order concepts, there will be conflicts; supermajority
rules/constitutionalism are one way of addressing the problem.
Most constitutions declare the primacy of popular sovereignty and proclaim
that ultimate power resides with "the people" through the democratic process.
At the same time, in keeping with the notion of limiting democratic govern-
ment, most constitutions also describe what the legislature, the representative of
the people, cannot do. By definition, democracy is antithetical to the concept
of inalienable rights. If the people are truly sovereign in the sense of control-
ling their destiny through the democratic process, then all rights must be alien-
able: a majority need only decide to alienate one right or another.2°
Amar almost concedes this point when he discusses exceptions to his First
Principles theory:
[The First Amendment may itself be a seemingly paradoxical exception to the
general rule that amendments must not be unamendable. Ironically, in order toprevent illegitimate entrenchment of the status quo, constitutional rules that
disentrench by keeping open the channels of constitutional change must them-
selves be entrenched. (Similarly, some free market transactions such as selling
oneself into slavery or agreeing to form a cartel must themselves be invalidated
in order to protect free market transactions generally.) 210
But who then is to choose which constitutional rules are appropriate candi-
dates for entrenchment? And how are such decisions to be made?
Time and again, Amar seems to undervalue the relation of First Princi-
ples to basic theories of constitutionalism. Amar asserts that it is clear that
"the substantive vision underlying my (and the Framers') process-based
theory of constitutional amendment is a vision of popular sovereignty,
which in turn is rooted in the substantive values of equality.., and neu-
trality (no substantive outcome-including the status quo-should be spe-
cially privileged)." 21  This statement, however, is fundamentally inaccurate
will prevail over momentary passions. Similarly, a constitution might represent a firm acknowl-
edgment that the desires of the government, even in a well-functioning republic, do not always
match those of the people. Constitutional limits, introduced by something like the people them-selves, therefore respond to the agency problem created by a system in which government offi-
cials inevitably have interests of their own.
... [The decision to take certain questions off the political agenda might be understood as ameans not of disabling but of protecting politics, by reducing the power of highly controversial
questions to create factionalism, instability, impulsiveness, chaos, stalemate, collective actionproblems, myopia, strategic behavior, or hostilities so serious and fundamental as to endanger
the governmental process itself. In this respect, the decision to use constitutionalism to removecertain issues from politics is often profoundly democratic. We can also see many constitutional
provisions as mechanisms for ensuring discussion and deliberation oriented toward agreement
about the general good rather than factionalism and self-interested bargaining ....
Sunstein, supra note 205, at 641-42.
20 Katz, supra note 5, at 252-53 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).210 Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 18, at 1045 n.1.
211 Id. at 1045.
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in that the Framers specifically privileged the status quo in the Constitution
by using supermajority rules-and not just in Article V. The Framers' re-
quirement of a two-thirds vote to expel a member from Congress, for ex-
ample, or to remove the President from office, was an intentional prefer-
encing of the status quo."2
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL AM1AR
At the beginning of this Article, I characterized Amar, in the context of
his First Principles assertions, as a "thinking man's Freeman." The term
"Freemen" is a loose reference to supporters of an ill-defined, quasi-
political movement-principally rural and western in scope-that advances
radical ideas regarding such matters as states' rights, gun ownership laws,
conspiracy theories, and the United Nations.' I offer this comparison be-
cause Amar's First Principles, like the theories proffered by the Freemen,
are not only feeble and historically inaccurate, but also socially danger-
ous.2"  In both cases, such ideas provide an intellectual hook on which to
hang a variety of half-baked, populist-inspired political ideas, such as the
notion that the House of Representatives could unilaterally rescind a por-
tion of the Constitution and thereafter legitimize such action through some
sort of national referendum-a Freemen theory with an uneasy parallel to
First Principles.' Consider, for example, a broad comparison between the
narrative of the Freemen movement and Amar's discourse on First Princi-
ples.
Part of Amar's theory requires reconciling the states' purportedly "ille-
gal" adoption of the Constitution by employing the rhetoric of popular
sovereignty. Similarly, a consistent theme in Freemen political philosophy
212 See supra note 3 (listing the Constitution's nine supermajority requirements).
213 See generally David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L REv. 879 (1996) (discussing the Freemen movement). For
purposes of this Article, I employ the term "Freemen" as an umbrella to denote the entire radical right-
wing movement sympathetic to Freemen views, including militias and Christian patrots, among others.
2 See Monaghan, supra note 31, at 175 ("In an era of talk show politis, single issue platforms, and
media-oriented presidents and national figures, Federalist No. 43's caution against an 'easy' amend-
ment process takes on a special appeaL") (citations omitted).
215 See, e.g., DANIEL LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC: How THE CONSTITUTION IS PARALYZING
DEmOCRACY (1996). Lazare suggests that, just as the Founders ignored the amending provision of the
Articles of Confederation when they proposed and ratified the Constitution. a simple majority of the
House of Representatives could repeal Article V's provision for equal state representation in the Senate.
then submit such action to a special election: "If the people approve of what the House has done, they
can vote the members who approved the amendment back into office. If they disapprove, they can vote
them out and leave it to a new crop of representatives to sort out the mess." Id. at 292. Lazare argues
that although such measures would run afoul of Article V (and other constitutional provisions), such a
procedure would not itself be unconstitutional; aside from Article V, there is another amending clause
that is superior-the Preamble. In declaring that "We the People" ordain and establish the Constitution
and everything in it, the Preamble provides its raison d'etre: the establishment of justice, endurance of
domestic tranquillity, etc. Implicit therein is the right of the People to alter or amed the Constitution,
irrespective of the textual provisions of Article V. See id. To support this admittedly "farfetched" the-
ory, Lazare cites the scholarship of Professor Amar. Id. at 293 n.6. Compare with Friedman & D-ker.
supra note 30 (criticizing Lazare's theories of constitutional interpretation).
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is that the Constitution was illegally adopted.2 6  Like Amar, the Freemen
base their political theories on revered texts of the founding era."7 Finally,
both Amar and the Freemen are "fighting the same fight Jefferson did
against Jay and Hamilton-the battle between those who favor a powerful
central government and those who favor local sovereignty. '' 2'8 Here, how-
ever, Amar is the nationalist while the Freemen support an ultra-radical vi-
sion of states' rights.
At their core, Amar's First Principles and Freemen political philosophy
bear a striking resemblance to each other in their outright rejection of con-
trolling text (notwithstanding hundreds of years of tradition to the contrary)
in favor of "higher law" notions such as popular sovereignty/majority
rule. l9  As the Freemen assert, "every man is a sovereign, free from the
clutches of state or federal authority [or Article V?], answerable only to the
divinely inspired words of the Constitution [We the People?] and the Bill
of Rights [the Tenth Amendment?]." 2 And many of the Freemen political
philosophies-stripped of their nutty corollaries and lunatic cant-bear an
eerie methodological resemblance to First Principles. For example, Amar
tells us that we (presumably all of us) have got it-our reading of the Con-
stitution-all wrong because "[w]e have been taught to look at the Consti-
tution through the wrong end of the telescope."' 2" Thanks to Amar's First
Principles, we can now see the Constitution as it was meant to be seen-the
way the Framers originally saw it. Interestingly, many of the leaders of the
Freemen movement assert that they-and only they-can understand re-
216 See, e.g., Freemen Just Con Men, START NEWS, Dec. 4, 1998, at A8 (discussing the Freemen
"ravings" about "whether the U.S. Constitution was properly adopted"); Myrna Shinbaum, ADL Re-
leases Report on Militia Activity, U.S. NEwswiRE, Apr. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
US Newswire ("Conspiracies alleging the illegality of the Federal system of government are particu-
larly attractive to the [Freemen] militias and Common law court activists.").
A related Freemen theme is that Texas was illegally admitted to the union because of the failure
of the people to approve the action. See, e.g., Charles Zewe & Lou Waters, Militia/Police Standoff in
Texas Continues (CNN Today broadcast, Apr. 28, 1997) (transcript # 97042802V13 available from
CNN). Reporting on the 1997 stand-off between the Republic of Texas militia group and Texas
authorities, Charles Zewe explained:
What they [certain Texas Freemen] want is to get Texas back. They are a group of separatists
who believe that Texas, when it was annexed to the United States in 1845 was annexed illegally.
They claim that there should have been a vote of the people. That Texas was a sovereign inde-
pendent nation, and that when the annexation took place by a vote of the Texas legislature, that
was illegal and they claim they now want a vote, a referendum by everybody in Texas, onwhether they want to be part of the United States. On top of that, they are asking for... 93 tril-
lion dollars in damage[s].
Id.217 See, e.g., Nicole Sterghos, 'Freeman' Awaits Trial-In Jail, SuN-SENTINEL, June 5, 1998, at 3B("Freemen share in the basic belief that the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the Magna Carta
are the only true laws and that these make Freemen immune from certain taxes, fees and regulations.").
218 Jim Nesbitt, Monticello Militiaman: How Selective Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's Ideas
Has Made Him a Favorite of the Far Right, NEws AND OBSERVER, Dec. 8, 1996, at A25.
219 See Shinbaum, supra note 216 (" [M]any anti-government extremists, militiamen included, refuse
to recognize the authority of legislators and law enforcement officials, and reject laws which they deem
to be intrusive....").
=0 Nesbitt, supra note 218 (providing supporting quotations from Jefferson).
221 Amar, Central Meaning of Republican Government, supra note 18, at 761.
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vered texts such as the Constitution and the Bible and that the rest of
America has got it all wrong. Thus, Freemen leaders often see it as their
role to educate the rest of us on what those founding era texts really
mean.
Amar places tremendous importance on the first three words of the
Constitution--"We the People"-and so do the Freemen. In fact, one
Freemen chapter in Colorado is called "We The People.)
' m Take, for ex-
ample, a quick reading of the following paragraph and ask whether it is
from Amar's writings or the rantings of the Freemen:
James Madison and the other framers of the Constitution knew that in the fu-
ture that if our Constitution was not interpreted in the context and according to
the history in which it was drafted, we would not have a proper understanding
of the original intent of our founding fathers, or in the words of Madison, pri-
mary author and the supreme expert on the Constitution: "Do not separate text
from historical background. If you do, you will have perverted and subverted
the Constitution ... ,,=4
The above passage appears on the first page of the Militia of Montana
website. Although the Freemen's political philosophy has been termed
"absurd, outrageous and even dangerous to the health of American demo-
cratic society,"2" it should be noted that a "lot of people [associated With
the Freemen movement] believe what they are doing is quite legitimate"
and a truly accurate reading of American history.
225 Like Amar, the Free-
men have a particular affection for the Writings of Thomas Jefferson. The
Freemen continually appropriate the writings of Jefferson to assert that a
careful, close (almost Straussian?) reading of Jeffersonian writings on lib-
erty and freedom will yield a body of coherent thought (at least to the
Freemen shaman) that provides a justification for their movement.
m  The
"cult-like" status of Jefferson in the Freemen movement is legendary; such
veneration was widely publicized when Oklahoma City bomber Timothy
McVeigh was arrested reportedly wearing a T-shirt With his favorite Jeffer-
son quotation: "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time
with the blood of patriots and tyrants." m Time and again, Amar cites Jef-
ferson's writings in support of First Principles; although Amar's reliance
= See Zewe & Waters, supra note 216. As Charles Zewe explained:
David Koresh thought he was the only person that could read the Bible and understand it. and
just like the Freemen up in Montana thought they could read the U.S. Constitution and under-
stand it, [Freeman] Richard McLaren thinks he is the only one who can also read the U.S. Con-
stitution and the Constitution of the State of Texas and the only one who knows international
law.
Id.
Shinbaum, supra note 216 (discussing a Denver-based organization called "We the People." an
anlgovemment group associated with the Montana Freemen).
The Militia of Montana (visited Apr. 22,1999) <httpJlwwwmidlinkcoml-bobhardom. html>.
Shinbaum, supra note 216.
2 id.
2" See Nesbitt, supra note 218, at A25 ("[In the expropriation of Jefferson, there is a larger lesson
about the unique and sometimes baroque way freemen and Christian patriots interpret the Constitu-
tion.").
=' Id
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on Jefferson is certainly less radical, it is nonetheless equally grandiloquent
at times, such as when he declares that "Jefferson's majestic proclamation
of self-evident truths has reached an even more exalted status: words
which people praise and do read, but don't understand. For if understood,
these words, and their evolving meaning between 1776 and 1789, call for a
fundamental rethinking of conventional understandings of the U.S. Con-
stitution." 2'
The problem with the philosophy of the Freemen is not only its theo-
retical incoherence, but also its historical inaccuracy: by selectively draw-
ing from the works of the Framers, the Freemen end up with a theory that is
wildly out of context. One Jefferson scholar has noted this feature of the
Freemen's theories:
"They're bastardizing Jefferson's views .... There's an anti-democratic un-
dergirding to this movement, cloaked by all this Jeffersonian libertarianism.
They [the Freemen] pick and choose those items of the icon that fit their
needs.... They pick and choose those sections of the Constitution they like.
The ones they like, they distort. The ones they don't like, they ignore." It is a
hallmark of the freeman and Christian patriot movement to loudly revere the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights and insist on a literal interpretation of these
words, instead of viewing it [sic] as most legal scholars do-as an elastic, liv-
ing text, subject to interpretation and timely revision. °
The above comparison is not offered to imply that Professor Amar is in
any way sympathetic to the Freemen movement. On the contrary, Amar
(like most Americans) seems to be diametrically opposed to almost every-
thing the Freemen espouse. Rather, the parallels are offered to make two
points. First, the founding era contains a large amount of rhetoric about the
rights of the people that is at its base both populist and plastic; it can be
used to justify any number of readings of the Framers' intent. The Coloni-
alists were fighting a war and founding a nation-actions that call for lead-
ership, ideology, and the emotional advocacy of a cause. By attempting to
turn their rhetoric into a political treatise, the Freemen take the Framers'
entire project out of context and thereby subject it to perversion." Second,
despite the many parallels, there is an odd divergence of consequence be-
tween the theories of the Freemen and Amar. When benighted rural
Americans wave historical texts in our face, selectively read history, and
offer novel and unsupported interpretations of the Constitution, we regard
2 Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 10, at 457. Cf. Militia Movement in the United States
(visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.worldfreeinternet.net/news/nws33.htn> ("Americans... have not
taken the time to read it [the Constitution] in detail, to familiarize themselves with the fact that all it
discusses are those powers that shall be invested in the three branches of the Federal Government.").
2M Nesbitt, supra note 218, at A25 (citation omitted).
2 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 24, at 868-69. Lessig notes:
In Sunstein's terms, this agreement about a "simple majority of the electorate" was incom-
pletely theorized; when we extend it to unforeseen contexts, it is no longer plain exactly how
this original agreement should be extended. And when one accounts for the institution making
the extension-here a court-the suggestion is that that extension should be in accord with cur-
rently backgrounded views. These views, the argument goes, could well require a supermajority
of the American electorate before an amendment could be considered ratified.
Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733 (1995).
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them as nutty and half-baked. When American academics and law profes-
sors do the same, we call them "brilliant,""' praise their work as "refresh-
ing," and label their theories "novel." But is there really a difference?
There is in the sense that the Freemen are considered wing nuts, while legal
counsel for President Clinton praise Amar as "[o]ne of America's leading
professors of constitutional law."2 3 It has been suggested that "the cru-
sading spirit threatens the scholarly spirit.""' With Amar's First Principles
this seems especially true. Admittedly, my criticisms of Amar in this Arti-
cle are caustic. If we expect law professors to be careful thinkers who rea-
son rigorously and candidly, rather than aloof intellectuals who spin soph-
istries, then I believe these criticisms are warranted, and that First
Principles is an impotent theory with little to offer the political and legal
community.
X. CONCLUSION
As long as American democracy exists without a clear understanding of
when it is appropriate to depart from majority rule, theorists, historians, le-
gal scholars, Freemen, and assorted pretenders to the throne will offer up
novel theories purportedly based on history that conveniently support a pre-
ferred course of action. All of these theories must be analyzed with the un-
derstanding that nature abhors a vacuum, and that a theoretical one is all
too easily filled by snake oil and tripe. Perhaps the simplest way to refute
the body of work that First Principles comprises is to put stock in the brief
words of William Davie, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, who
maintained during the drafting of the Constitution in Philadelphia that " [i]t
must be granted that there is no way of obtaining amendments but the mode
prescribed in the Constitution; two thirds of the legislatures of the states...
may require Congress to call a convention to propose amendments, or the
same proportion of both houses may propose them." '' S I believe this is
what the Framers meant, intended, and understood, Amar and the Freemen
notwithstanding.
Dow, supra note 4, at 2 n.3 ("[L]egal scholars periodically devise elaborate arguments in support
of counterintuitive propositions. They thus earn the label 'brilliant.'"); see also Daniel A. Farber. The
Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L REV. 917 (1986) (arguing against brilliance as a value in legal
theory). For a pointed response to Professor Farber's essay, see Pierre Schlag, Comment. The Brilliant.
the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L REV. 917 (1987). But see Daniel A. Farber. Brilliance Revis.
ited, 72 MINN. L REV. 367 (1987).
W Haniffa Aziz, Indian American Aids White House Defense, INDIA ABROAD. Feb. 12. 1999, at 8.
2M Peter Berkowitz, Reduction and Betrayal NEv REPuBuc. Aug. 23. 1999. at 38. 39 (re'iewving
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